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I. INTRODUCTION
EW judges are more revered than the late Henry J. Friendly, a
member of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit from 1959 to 1986.1 Leading jurists and scholars have de-
scribed him as "one of our wisest judges,"2 "a legend in his own time," 3
"the most remarkable legal mind of his generation," 4 "the pre-eminent
appellate judge of his era,"5 and "the most distinguished judge in this
country during his years on the bench."'6 How does such a reputation
come about?
Historians and literary critics have shown that great reputations do not
rest simply on great work.7 Rather they are in significant measure the
1. For an overview of Judge Friendly's career and achievements, see Extraordinary
Session of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, In Memoriam, Honorable Henry J.
Friendly, 805 F.2d LXXXI (1986) [hereinafter Extraordinary Session]. See also JEFFREY B.
MORRIS, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 176-78 (1987) (biographical sketch of
Judge Friendly).
2. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 565 (1989) (Steven, J., dissenting).
3. Bruce A. Ackerman et al., In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1709, 1715 (1986) (comments of Prof. Paul Freund).
4. Edward Weinfeld, A Tribute to Henry J. Friendly, 1978 ANN. SURV. AM. L. xx,
xxiv. Weinfeld was a member of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York.
5. Letter from Jon 0. Newman, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, March 24, 1986, at A18.
6. Michael Norman, Henry J. Friendly, Federal Judge in Court of Appeals, Is Dead at
82, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 1986, at B6 (quoting Judge Richard A. Posner, a member of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit).
When Judge Friendly died, the Harvard Law Review published seven tributes to him.
See Ackerman et al., supra note 3. Portraying him more as an icon than human being, the
tributes made no mention of the fact that he had taken his own life. See Paul Gewirtz, A
Lawyer's Death, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2053 (1987) (addressing the failure of the tributes to
refer to Friendly's suicide). Professor Gewirtz noted that "we almost always pay a price
when lawyers ignore the humanity of their subjects." Id. at 2055.
7. See, e.g., JOHN RODDEN, THE POLITICS OF LITERARY REPUTATION: THE MAKING
AND CLAIMING OF 'ST. GEORGE' ORWELL (1989); LAWRENCE H. SCHWARTZ, CREATING
FAULKNER'S REPUTATION (1988); GARY TAYLOR, REINVENTING SHAKESPEARE (1989);
CHARLOTTE TEMPLIN, FEMINISM AND THE POLITICS OF LITERARY REPUTATION (1995);
JANE TOMPKINS, SENSATIONAL DESIGNS: THE CULTURAL WORK OF AMERICAN FICTION
1790-1860 (1985); GAYE TUCHMAN, EDGING WOMEN OUT: VICTORIAN NOVELISTS, PUB-
LISHERS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1989); PETER WIDDOWSON, HARDY IN HISTORY: A
STUDY IN LITERARY SOCIOLOGY (1989); R.C. Lewontin, Darwin, Mendel & the Mind, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, Oct. 10, 1985, at 18; Marshall Missner, Why Einstein Became Famous in
America, 15 SOC. STUD. SCI. 267 (1985). See also ROBERT E. KAPSIS, HITCHCOCK: THE
MAKING OF A REPUTATION (1992); CHARLES J. MALAND, CHAPLIN AND AMERICAN CUL-
TURE: THE EVOLUTION OF A STAR IMAGE (1989); Gladys E. Lang & Kurt Lang, Recogni-
tion and Renown: The Survival of Artistic Reputation, 94 AM. J. Soc. 79 (1988).
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product of contingencies 8-fortuitous features of the social context. 9
Consider how the reputation of George Orwell, who published Nineteen
Eighty-Four in 1949,10 benefited from the particular era in which he
wrote. Orwell's treatment of the clash between freedom and totalitarian-
ism was especially well received in an era obsessed about the Cold War.
As a commentator recently observed, "If Nineteen Eight-Four had not
become enmeshed in ongoing East-West polemics, its reputation might be
strictly literary, and it might today be regarded as a period piece.""
Another contingency might be called "means" or "opportunity."
Orwell gained enormously from writing in English: "Surely Orwell would
be less well known today to the international reading public, no matter
how appealing his prose style, if he had written in Bulgarian, a language
with no internationally recognized literary tradition and whose linguistic
community is without power or status."'12
Consider also the advantages of a distinguished sponsor. While still a
relative unknown, Orwell was acclaimed by Lionel Trilling, a professor of
English at Columbia University whose own stature in literary and aca-
demic circles was "practically unrivalled.' 3 Trilling's endorsements "go
far to explain why Orwell-and not other writers . . .- came to figure in
the '50s as an intellectual hero in many lives besides Trilling's." 14
Consider finally that the sheer availability of voluminous work product
precipitates scholarly attention. Charles Darwin, to whom the theory of
evolution is largely credited, is far better known than Gregor Mendel,
discoverer of the genetic laws that made Darwin's theory possible.15 This
is due partly to the fact that Darwin's extensive papers survived, whereas
most of Mendel's were destroyed by fire. 16
Although legal scholars write extensively about eminent judges,' 7 they
have largely ignored the impact of contingencies on judicial reputations.' 8
Judge Posner's recent book on Cardozo is no exception.' 9 Posner gave
8. Historians and literary critics speak of reputations as being "contingent." See, e.g.,
TEMPLIN, supra note 7, at ix; Missner, supra note 7, at 288. This Article adopts that
phraseology.
9. See studies cited in supra note 7.
10. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
11. RODDEN, supra note 7, at 404.
12. Id. at 63 (footnote omitted).
13. Id. at 82.
14. Id. at 83. See also TOMPKINS, supra note 7, at 9-10 (describing Henry Wadsworth
Longfellow's sponsorship of Nathaniel Hawthorne).
15. Lewontin, supra note 7, at 18.
16. Id. at 19-20. See also TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 380 (making the point that only five
percent of Sophocles's work survives, whereas virtually all of Shakespeare's work does).
17. See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Art of Judicial Biography, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
1595 (1995) (reviewing recent biographies of Justices Black and Powell and Judge Learned
Hand); John W. Poulos, The Judicial Philosophy of Roger Traynor, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1643
(1995); Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer,
105 YALE L.J. 1445 (1996).
18. A recent exception is G. Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and Bran-
deis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputations, 20 N.Y.U. L. REV. 576 (1995).
19. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990).
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contingencies-such as Cardozo's courting of academics and his member-
ship on the New York Court of Appeals-only cursory mention.20 More-
over, he lambasted emphasis on contingencies as "part of a radical-left
project" bent on demonstrating that "white male Western culture has no
intrinsic superiority."'2 Other scholars may worry that attention to the
impact of contingencies on judicial careers risks undermining the legal
profession's meritocratic self-image. 22
Are great judicial reputations-like great literary and scientific reputa-
tions-also shaped by contingencies? Or does the legal profession for
some reason stand apart? This Article shows that great judges are not
special. Friendly was as much the beneficiary of contingencies as Orwell
and Darwin.
Appointed to the bench at age fifty-five, following more than thirty
years of private law practice2 3 and a clerkship with Justice Brandeis,2 4
Judge Friendly achieved renown in subjects as divergent as federal juris-
diction,2 5 criminal procedure, 26 securities regulation, 27 and tax law.28
This Article focuses on his reputation in securities regulation.2 9
Judge Friendly is said to have done "more to shape the law of securities
regulation than any [other] judge in the country. ' 30 The author of eighty
20. Id. at 128-32. Posner attributed Cardozo's reputation largely to his "rhetoric and
pragmatism." Id. at 132. These qualities of Cardozo are the focus of much of Posner's
book. See id. chs. 2, 3, 6.
21. POSNER, supra note 19, at 63-64. He criticizes the studies of the impact of contin-
gencies on literary reputations by erroneously insinuating the typicality of one study that
marginalizes merit and treats contingencies as essentially all-determinative. See id. at 62-64
(discussing TAYLOR, supra note 7). This appears to be an apt description of Taylor's book.
See TAYLOR, supra note 7, at 4-6, 373-411. However, it is not typical of the genre as a
whole. See, e.g., RODDEN, supra note 7, at ix, 58 (finding reputations to derive from both
merit and contingencies); TOMPKINS, supra note 7, at 33 (same).
22. The many references to Judge Friendly's outstanding law school record represent
an expression of this self-image. See, e.g., Ackerman et al., supra note 3, at 1713 (com-
ments of Judge Wilfred Feinberg); Extraordinary Session, supra note 1, at XC (comments
of Judge J. Edward Lumbard); id. at LXXVII (comments of Justice Thurgood Marshall).
23. See generally Lyman M. Tondel, Jr., Henry J. Friendly: Practicing Lawyer 1928-
1959, 1978 ANN. SURV. AM. L. xxv. See also Conference on Codification of the Federal
Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 900 (1967) (comments of Judge Henry Friendly) (noting
that "I did not have very many proceedings before the SEC when I was in practice, at least
not many on the front line").
24. For a summary of Friendly's pre-judicial career, see Extraordinary Session, supra
note 1, at LXXXII (statement of Justice Thurgood Marshall).
25. See David P. Currie, On Blazing Trails: Judge Friendly and Federal Jurisdiction,
133 U. PA. L. REV. 5 (1984).
26. See Frank t. Goodman, Judge Friendly's Contributions to Securities Law and Crim-
inal Procedure: "Moderation is All," 133 U. PA. L. REV. 10, 23-32 (1984).
27. See Ackerman et al., supra note 3, at 1722 (comments of Prof. Louis Loss); Good-
man, supra note 26, at 11-23.
28. See Weinfeld, supra note 4, at xxi & n.6 (collecting illustrative noteworthy Friendly
opinions in the area of tax law).
29. How contingencies may have contributed to Judge Friendly's reputation in areas
other than securities regulation is a fertile area for future study.
30. Ackerman et al., supra note 3, at 1723 (comments of Prof. Louis Loss). See, e.g.,
RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1552 n.8 (7th ed. 1992) (describ-
ing Judge Bork as "perhaps alone unintimidated by the aura of Judge Friendly"); MARC I.
STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.05, at 22 (2d ed. 1993) (referring to "the eminent
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majority opinions in the area,31 he tackled everything from Rule 10b-532
and the proxy rules33 to extraterritoriality,3 4 criminality, 35 and tender of-
fers.36 His name appears in ten securities opinions of the United States
Supreme Court 37 as well as in three hundred fifty-five securities opinions
of the lower federal courts outside the Second Circuit.38 Nineteen of his
opinions (hereinafter the "casebook opinions") have appeared as princi-
pal cases39 in securities regulation casebooks. 40
This Article demonstrates the impact of contingencies on the develop-
Judge Friendly"); Adena Exploration, Inc. v. Sylvan, 860 F.2d 1242, 1252 (5th Cir. 1988)
(describing Judge Friendly as "one of the leading interpreters of the federal securities
laws").
31. To obtain this figure, the following search was run in Westlaw's Second Circuit
(CTA2) file: Ju (Friendly) and ("securities exchange act" "securities act" "trust indenture
act" "investment advisors act" "investment company act" "public utility holding company
act" "securities investor protection act"). The resultant list was then purged of all opinions
containing merely extraneous references to the federal securities statutes, such as refer-
ences by analogy. Also eliminated were duplicate opinions, one-judge orders, concur-
rences, dissents, and en banc opinions.
32. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
33. See, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Rosenblatt
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 435 F.2d 1121 (2d Cir. 1970).
34. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Solomon, 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975).
36. See, e.g., Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty, Inc., 599 F.2d 1140 (2d
Cir. 1979); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969).
37. See, e.g., Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,
701 (1980); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,486 n.16 (1979) (citing Judge Friendly's observa-
tion concerning a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463, 475 n.27 (1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 42 (1977); TSC Indus. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197,
211, 214 (1976); Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975); Kern
County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 604 n.31 (1973); Caplin v.
Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 430 (1972). See also Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 373, 387 n.86, 390 (1982) (Commodities Exchange
Act); Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 163 n.10, 166 (1966) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
38. To obtain this figure, the following search was run in Westlaw's file of federal cases
("allfeds"): ("securities act" "securities exchange act" "investment advisors act" "invest-
ment company act" "public utility holding company act" "trust indenture act" "securities
investor protection act") & ("Judge Friendly" "Friendly, J.") % CO (two NY CT VT).
After the Supreme Court opinions were eliminated, the resultant list contained 355 opin-
ions. No attempt was made to eliminate opinions containing merely extraneous securities
references, such as references by analogy. Cf supra note 31.
39. "Principal cases" are opinions reprinted largely in full. In addition to majority
opinions on behalf of three-judge panels, principal cases may include concurring, dissent-
ing, and en banc opinions.
40. For a list of opinions by Judge Friendly that appear in current securities regulation
casebooks or in earlier editions of those casebooks, see infra Appendix I.
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ment of Judge Friendly's reputation. 41 Its purpose is to help move analy-
sis of contingencies into the mainstream of legal scholarship. Disregard
of contingencies is costly because valuable insights about both individual
judges and the judicial system are simply shut out.
Part II examines the interplay between Judge Friendly's work and his
era. A judicial activist, Friendly worked during an era in which judicial
activism held sway.42 In general, activist judges have greater opportuni-
ties for renown than do those devoted to maintaining the status quo or to
curtailing a previous era's excesses. The activist receives credit for the
doctrines she creates, whereas the status quo maintainer and the curtailer
at most share credit with the authors of the doctrines they seek to main-
tain or curtail.
Part III focuses on Judge Friendly's court. Known as securities regula-
tion's "Mother Court,"4 3 the Second Circuit provided a securities docket
that was quantitatively large and qualitatively meaty. During securities
regulation's activist era, Second Circuit opinions accounted for up to sev-
enty percent of the federal appeals court opinions appearing as principal
cases in securities regulation casebooks.
Part IV shows the ways in which Judge Friendly's reputation was en-
hanced by Professor Louis Loss of Harvard Law School,44 this century's
leading securities regulation scholar.45 Much of the material for this part
41. This Article does not consider the ways in which contingencies may contribute to
the maintenance of Judge Friendly's reputation. Cf. Lang & Lang, supra note 7 (address-
ing the maintenance of reputations).
42. This Article uses the term judicial activism to refer to loose statutory construction
and the identification and creation of new rights on behalf of the legislature's chosen bene-
ficiaries. See infra text accompanying note 49.
43. Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Continental Grain (Australia) Pty Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409,
413 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 115 & n.29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 938 (1977); Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (re-
ferring to "the Second Circuit's preeminence in the field of securities law").
44. Professor Loss joined the Harvard faculty in 1952. From 1962-84, he was the Wil-
liam Nelson Cromwell Professor. In 1984, he became Professor Emeritus. ASSOCIATION
OF AM. LAW SCHS., AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1996-97, at 641.
Professor Loss was of course himself affected by his era and circumstances, including his
association with Judge Friendly. Analysis of Loss's reputation, however, is beyond the
scope of this Article.
45. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Bauman, Loss and Seligman on Securities Regulation: An Es-
say for Don Schwartz, 78 GEO. L.J. 1753, 1753 (1990) ("the preeminent scholar in the
field"); Norman S. Poser, A Monument to a Regulatory System, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1797,
1797 (1994) ("the foremost scholar" of securities law); Stephen Labaton, For the Father of
Securities Law, Yet Another Milestone, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, § 3, at 8 (noting that
"[f]or most of the second half of this century, Louis Loss has been known as the intellec-
tual father of securities law"). For Loss's autobiography, see Louis Loss, ANECDOTES OF
A SECURITIES LAWYER 1-76 (1995) [hereinafter Loss, ANECDOTES].
Professor Loss is the author (along with Professor Joel Seligman) of the authoritative
treatise on securities regulation. I-XI Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGU-
LATION (3d ed. 1989 & Supps. 1995 & 1996) [hereinafter Loss & SELIGMAN, THIRD EDI-
TION]. The second edition of the treatise, which Loss authored alone, was published in
1961 and amplified by a three-volume supplement in 1969. I-III Louis Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION (2d ed. 1961); IV-VI SECURITIES REGULATION (2d ed. Supp. 1969) [hereinaf-
ter Loss, SECOND EDITION]. The first edition of the treatise, likewise authored solely by
[Vol. 50
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comes from Friendly's own papers. 46
Part V addresses the volume of Judge Friendly's securities opinions,
which far exceeded that of any other Second Circuit judge during the
activist era in securities regulation. Part V identifies both the factors that
caused Friendly to write more securities opinions than his colleagues as
well as the reputational benefits that he reaped as a result.
II. JUDGE FRIENDLY'S ERA IN SECURITIES REGULATION
How did Judge Friendly's era affect his reputation in securities regula-
tion? A starting point for answering this question is an observation of
Judge Posner that runs somewhat counter to his overall view of contin-
gencies: "Given two . . . judges ... of equal quality, one may be more
influential than another simply because he is working at a time ... [when]
standards ... are more fluid than at other times .... ,,47 While Posner did
not elaborate, 48 this observation is eminently plausible. When standards
are fluid, judges are freer to write opinions that change the law-opinions
more likely to be reputation-enhancing than those that simply recapitu-
late well-settled understandings. The former are news, whereas the latter
are not.
While freedom to change the law may be advantageous, the degree of
advantage may turn on the nature of the changes that a judge brings
about. Some changes-borne of judicial activism-involve loose statu-
tory construction and the identification and creation of new rights on be-
half of the legislature's chosen beneficiaries. Other changes-borne of
judicial restraint-involve curtailing the excesses of a previous era.49 In
general, activist judges have greater opportunities for renown than do
judges who curtail past excesses. The activist receives credit for the doc-
trines she creates, whereas the curtailer at most shares credit with the
authors of the doctrines he pares back.
Moreover, the reputation of an activist judge depends to a significant
degree on whether the changes endure. Transient changes-such as those
quickly trumped by Congress or the Supreme Court-are apt soon to be
Loss, was published in 1951 and supplemented in 1955. Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION (1951 & Supp. 1955) [hereinafter Loss, FIRST EDITION].
46. The Henry J. Friendly Papers [hereinafter Friendly Papers] are available in the
Harvard Law School Library. They comprise more than 100 boxes of materials, including
professional and personal correspondence and memoranda to other members of the Sec-
ond Circuit regarding cases before the court.
47. POSNER, supra note 19, at 71. Posner made this observation in the context of dis-
cussing whether to measure a judge's reputation by the frequency with which she is cited.
Id. at 70-71. Since Posner did not apply this observation to Cardozo (or to any other
judge), it is hard to know just how he would square it with his overall view of contingen-
cies, which is discussed supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
48. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 71; see also supra note 47.
49. For a discussion of judicial activism and restraint, see Richard E. Levy & Robert L.
Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's Environmental Law De-
cisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 347-63 (1989).
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forgotten, along with the judges who brought them about.50 Enduring
changes-and the judges who brought them about-are likely to be
remembered.
Finally, a judge who espouses his era's prevailing philosophy is more
apt to be celebrated than is a judge of equivalent caliber who challenges
that philosophy head-on. Thus, for example, neither Brandeis nor
Holmes would have been likely to develop a great reputation in "the
premodernist era."'51
Judge Friendly's years on the bench encompassed the 1960s and early
1970s, a time of substantial judicial activism in the law of securities regu-
lation. What triggered the activism? Did the activism spawn important
and enduring changes? And did Judge Friendly engage in activism
himself?
A. WHY JUDICIAL ACrIvisM HELD SWAY
The 1960s and early 1970s saw judicial activism at play across the legal
landscape. Indeed, during this time the Supreme Court discovered in the
Constitution rights to privacy 52 and abortion, 53 loosened standing re-
quirements for challenges to agency action,54 and recognized implied ac-
tions as to which Congress had been silent.55
Securities regulation was fertile soil for activist judges. This was due in
part to the new importance of securities regulation as an area of law. Its
importance derived from several factors. First, there had been a dramatic
increase in the quantity of transactions to which the federal securities
laws apply56-the number of public offerings in 1968 was more than triple
that in 195857 and the dollar volume of stocks sold on the stock exchanges
50. Cf. Harry M. Reasoner, The Inner Workings of a Great Court, 50 TEX. L. REV. 210,
210-11 (1971) (reviewing MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT (1970)) (noting that
if a United States circuit judge "writes brilliantly and wisely upon a major issue, his deci-
sion may well be overshadowed by a superseding but inferior decision of the Supreme
Court").
51. White, supra note 18, at 619.
52. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See generally Archibald Cox, The Role of
the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism or Self-Restraint?, 47 MD. L. REV. 118, 122-29 (1987).
54. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154-56
(1970).
55. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 735-38 (1979) (Powell, J., dis-
senting) (collecting and discussing cases).
56. There are seven federal securities statutes: Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(a)-(mm) (1994); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)-(kk) (1994); Pub-
lic Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79a to 79z-6 (1994); Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa-77bbbb (1994); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-I to 80a-64 (1994); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to 80b-21
(1994); and Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa-78111 (1994).
The most important of these are the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. The 1933 Act is princi-
pally directed at the initial distribution of securities, while the 1934 Act concentrates on the
secondary markets. For an overview of the federal securities statutes, see Louis Loss &
JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 33-47 (3d ed. 1995).
57. See 35 SEC ANN. REP. 187 (1969). The total number of registrations in 1958 was
16,490. In 1968, the number had climbed to 54,076. Id.
[Vol. 50
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more than quintuple.58 In addition, more companies than ever before
had become subject to the 1934 Act's periodic disclosure, proxy solicita-
tion, and insider trading provisions following a 1964 amendment to that
Act.59 And finally, the volume of securities litigation had reached new
heights.60
Another reason that the law of securities regulation drew the attention
of activist judges is that many of the important statutory provisions are
phrased in broad language. For example, section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 61
prohibits "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance, ' 62 and
Rule 10b-563 prohibits "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud." 64
Moreover, the 1933 and 1934 Acts provide no definition of crucial terms
58. See id. at 193. The dollar volume in thousands for 1958 was 38,419,560. In 1968,
the figure had climbed to 197,117,957. Id.
59. See id. at 42. Prior to the 1964 amendment, these provisions were applicable only
to companies traded on national securities exchanges. The effect of the amendment was to
make them applicable as well to companies of a specified size whose securities were traded
over the counter. See generally Richard M. Phillips & Morgan Shipman, An Analysis of
the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706, 710-97.
60. This statement is based on searches in Westlaw's "allfeds" file for the years 1958
and 1968. In 1958, there were 60 opinions which cited to one or more of the seven federal
securities statutes, which are set forth supra note 56. In 1968, the number of such opinions
issued was 197. Cf Jeffry Netter, Using Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Litigation,
in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION 162 n.2 (Kenneth Lehn & Robert W.
Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1992) (noting that "the increase in securities fraud suits is highly corre-
lated with the increase in the volume of shares traded").
61. Section 10 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
62. For the text of § 10(b), see supra note 61.
63. Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
1942, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
64. For the text of Rule 10b-5, see supra note 63.
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such as "seller, '65 "tender offer," 66 and a "transaction ... not involving
any public offering. '67 This generality was, in all likelihood, an invitation
to activism for judges who were even moderately predisposed in that
direction.
Within the lower federal courts in particular, activism flourished as the
result of securities decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Before
the 1960s, the Court had given broad readings to the definition of a secur-
ity68 and to the private offering exemption.69 It also allowed investors to
sue for fraud notwithstanding an arbitration agreement to the contrary.70
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the Court authorized implied actions
under several statutory provisions 71 and established presumptions of reli-
ance on behalf of those who sued under those provisions.72
Activism also thrived during the 1960s and early 1970s because of the
wide range of securities issues that the Supreme Court had yet to address.
These included regulation of tender offers73 as well as the application of
Rule 10b-5 to insider trading 74 and to transnational transactions. 75 In ad-
dressing these issues, the lower federal courts were largely unconstrained.
This Article refers to the era of judicial activism in securities regulation
as the "critical period." The critical period is deemed to start on Novem-
ber 8, 1961, the date of the SEC's decision applying Rule 10b-5 to insider
trading.76 It is deemed to end on March 23, 1977, the date of the
65. Sellers of securities are subject to liability under § 12 of the 1933 Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 771 (1994). As the Supreme Court has noted, however, "the Securities Act no-
where delineates who may be regarded as a statutory seller." Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622,
642 (1988).
66. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 56, at 513 (noting that "[iut is odd that ...
'tender offer' . . . is defined by neither statute nor rule").
67. This is the language of § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1994), popularly
known as the private offering exemption. As the Supreme Court has noted, the 1933 Act
does not set forth the boundaries of this exemption. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119, 122 (1953).
68. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
69. See Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 126-27.
70. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-38 (1953), overruled by, Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
71. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971) (Rule 10b-5); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964) (Rule 14a-9).
72. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972) (presumption
under Rule 10b-5); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970) (presump-
tion under Rule 14a-9). For a history of Supreme Court decisions in the securities area, see
Alfred E. Conard, Securities Regulation in the Burger Court, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 193, 194-
204 (1985).
73. The Supreme Court first addressed the tender offer provisions of the 1934 Act in
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
74. The first Supreme Court decision to address the application of Rule lOb-5 to in-
sider trading was Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
75. The Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of the extraterritorial reach of
Rule lOb-5 in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 514 n.8, 518 n.12 (1974).
76. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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Supreme Court's most significant curtailment of Rule 10b-5.77
B. How JUDICIAL AcTIVISM CHANGED THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION
During the critical period, lower federal court judges brought to life a
vast array of rights and duties designed to protect the investing public.78
One illustration is the use of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to prohibit
insider trading. Neither provision mentions insider trading,79 which is ad-
dressed expressly, albeit narrowly, by an entirely different provision of
the 1934 Act. 80 Following the lead of a 1961 decision by the SEC,81 lower
federal courts nevertheless read Rule 10b-5 to prohibit insider trading.8 2
Another illustration involves Rule 10b-5's extraterritorial reach. Con-
gress provided no direct guidance on this subject, 83 which arose increas-
ingly in the 1960s and early 1970s as the securities markets became more
internationalized. 84 Lower federal courts nonetheless applied Rule 10b-5
to transactions involving various foreign components, such as foreign
plaintiffs and defendants, foreign securities, and trades or misrepresenta-
tions made in foreign countries.85
A third illustration is the private action under Rule 10b-5. Congress
and the SEC conceived of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as enforceable by
the government only8 6 and thus did not expressly authorize a private ac-
tion for their violation.87 By 1969, ten of the eleven federal courts of
77. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Cf. JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
SECURITIES REGULATION 753 (1991) (characterizing Santa Fe as "perhaps the most funda-
mental of the Supreme Court's retrenchment decisions under Rule 10b-5").
78. For an overview of judicial activism in the federal statutory context, see Levy &
Glicksman, supra note 49, at 355-58.
79. For the text of § 10(b), see supra note 61. For the text of Rule 10b-5, see supra
note 63.
80. See § 16(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994), which prohibits purchases
and sales, or sales and purchases, by specified persons within a six month period. For an
overview of § 16(b), see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 56, at 554-91.
81. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
82. See, e.g., Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 418 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 830 (1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
83. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
But cf. Margaret V. Sachs, The International Reach of Rule 10b-5: The Myth of Congres-
sional Silence, 28 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 677 (1990) (arguing that Congress chose to extend
the benefits of the 1933 and 1934 Acts only to those investors whose trades occur in the
United States).
84. For a history of the internationalization of the securities markets, see SEC, RE-
PORT TO SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND HOUSE
COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES
MARKETS ch. III, at 29-33 (1987).
85. See, e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977);
Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993; Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326
(2d Cir. 1972).
86. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729-30 (1975).
87. For the text of § 10(b), see supra note 61. For the text of Rule 10b-5, see supra
note 63.
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appeals had nonetheless implied a private action. 88 By the mid-1970s, the
implied action under Rule 10b-5 had become "a judicial oak ... grown
from little more than a legislative acorn."'89
The private action for proxy fraud furnishes a fourth illustration. The
provisions governing proxy fraud-section 14(a) of the 1934 Act 90 and
Rule 14a-991-do not expressly authorize private lawsuits. 92 But in 1964,
the Supreme Court recognized an implied action for proxy fraud,93 and
lower federal courts subsequently gave that action an expansive scope.94
Consider finally the matter of tender offers, which were not addressed
in the 1934 Act as originally enacted. 95 In the wake of the proliferation
of tender offers during the 1960s,96 Congress amended the 1934 Act in
1968 to cover them. 97 During the critical period, lower federal courts
construed the amendment liberally98 and implied an action for fraud con-
nected with a tender offer.99
The creation of new rights and duties under the federal securities laws
did not continue indefinitely. By the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court be-
gan to take a more restrictive view of the federal securities laws o00 as well
as of implied actions,101 thereby bringing the activist era in securities reg-
ulation to a close.
Even though judicial activism in securities regulation subsided, the
rights and duties that activism had spawned endured. Indeed, courts to-
day routinely apply Rule 10b-5 to insider trading10 2 and transnational
88. See Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5:
Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96, 96 n.3 (1985).
89. Blue Chips Stamps, 421 U.S. 723 at 737.
90. Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994).
91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1996) (Rule 14a-9).
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1996).
93. See Borak, 377 U.S. at 430-31.
94. See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 384 (2d Cir. 1974)
(broad interpretation of causation element), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(finding defendant's failure to disclose its belief that it had obtained "working control" as
the result of a merger to be materially misleading).
95. For an overview of Congress's consideration of tender offers, see V Loss & SELIG-
MAN, THIRD EDITION, supra note 45, at 2161-69.
96. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
97. The Williams Act, a set of amendments to the 1934 Act enacted in 1968, is codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1994).
98. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 598 (5th Cir.) (broad
definition of term "tender offer"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v.
Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (same).
99. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir. 1973);
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 946 (2d Cir. 1969).
100. See Conard, supra note 72; Paul D. Freeman, A Study in Contrasts: The Warren
and Burger Courts' Approach to the Securities Laws, 83 DICK. L. REV. 183 (1979); Lewis D.
Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Pen-
dulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977).
101. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 6.3.3, at 359-63 (2d ed. 1994).
102. See, e.g., San Leandro Emergency Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip
Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801, 814-15 (2d Cir. 1996); SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 632-34 (7th Cir.
1995).
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transactions. 10 3 Moreover, the private actions under Rules 10b-5 and
14a-9, while modified in some respects, 104 remain cornerstones of federal
securities practice, 05 as do the rights and duties associated with tender
offers.106 Thus, in the words of Professors Loss and Seligman, "One may
still cry, 'Viva la revoluci6n! ' ''" 0 7
C. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND JUDGE FRIENDLY
While generally an activist, Judge Friendly was no slavish adherent to
activism in all circumstances. 0 8 But he did not appreciably distance him-
self from activism either, even in those instances in which he declined to
adopt an activist position.
As examples of his activism, consider the casebook opinions in Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell'0 9 and Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc." 0 Both addressed Rule 10b-5's extraterritorial reach, a
subject on which Congress had provided no direct guidance."1 Judge
Friendly nonetheless generated principles of extraterritoriality based on
"a purely hypothetical legislative intent"1 2-"what Congress would have
wished if these problems had occurred to it."'113 He did so even as he
conceded that "if we were asked to point to language in the statutes, or
even in the legislative history, that compelled these conclusions, we
would be unable to respond." 14
Another example of Friendly's activism comes from the casebook opin-
ion in Goldberg v. Meridor,"5 which salvaged the plaintiffs' Rule 10b-5
action through artful construction of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Santa Fe Industries v. Green.16 A footnote in Santa Fe had held Rule
10b-5 unavailable to shareholders who sought to challenge a merger
when they lacked both a vote on the merger and the right to enjoin it
103. See, e.g., Itoba, Ltd. v. Lep Group, PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 702 (1996); Sloane Overseas Fund, Ltd. v. Sapiens Int'l Corp., 941 F.
Supp. 1369, 1373-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
104. See, e.g., Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (eliminat-
ing aiding and abetting liability in Rule 10b-5 private actions); Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1099-1108 (1991) (eliminating presumption of reliance in Rule
14a-9 private actions where management has sufficient votes to approve the transaction).
105. See generally IX Loss & SELIGMAN, THIRD EDITION, supra note 45, at 4339-60
(discussing private action under the proxy rules); id. at 4383-4431 (discussing private action
under Rule 10b-5).
106. See V Loss & SELIGMAN, THIRD EDITION, supra note 45, at 2123-2262; IX Loss &
SELIGMAN, THIRD EDITION, supra note 45, at 4375-82.
107. VII Loss & SELIGMAN, THIRD EDITION, supra note 45, at 3489.
108. This Article uses judicial activism to refer to loose statutory construction and the
identification and creation of new rights on behalf of the legislature's chosen beneficiaries.
See supra text accompanying note 49.
109. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
110. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
111. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
112. Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 30.
113. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993. See Maxwell, 468 F.2d at 1337.
114. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993.
115. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
116. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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under state law. 117 Writing in Goldberg, Judge Friendly seized on the
Santa Fe footnote's "'negative implication""'1 8 and held that shareholders
who had the right to enjoin a merger under state law had a concomitant
right to use Rule 10b-5.11 9 He thereby ran roughshod over the final part
of the Santa Fe opinion,120 which cautioned against expanding Rule 10b-5
to "overlap and quite possibly interfere with state corporate law,' 12' on
the ground that to do so risked violating the intent of Congress.122
Other casebook opinions fall outside the activist mold.123 In his con-
curring opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,124 Judge Friendly
maintained that section 10(b) did not encompass negligence and that
therefore plaintiffs suing under Rule 10b-5 had to establish the defend-
ant's scienter. 25 His position was hardly activist, since it entailed strict
statutory construction and made it harder for investors to sue. Yet he
distanced himself from activism only so far. For example, nowhere in
Texas Gulf Sulphur did he argue that a private action under Rule 10b-5
should not have been implied in the first place.
Likewise largely devoid of activism is Friendly's majority opinion in
Barnes v. Osofsky.' 26 At issue was the express private action for fraud in
a registration statement set forth in section 11 of the 1933 Act.' 27
Grounding his arguments in legislative history and statutory language, 28
Judge Friendly required all section 11 plaintiffs to "trace" their shares to
the registration statement they claimed was fraudulent. 129 In so doing, he
turned a deaf ear to the difficulties that tracing presents for some plain-
tiffs. 130 But the departure from activism was not substantial, since tracing
117. See id. at 474 n.14. The reason given was that the shareholders failed to "indicate
how they might have acted differently" if they had had full disclosure. Id.
118. Healey v. Catalyst Recovery of Pa., Inc., 616 F.2d 641,652 (3d Cir. 1980) (Aldisert,
J., dissenting) (quoting Kerrigan v. Merrill Lynch, Pearce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 450 F.
Supp. 639, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
119. See Goldberg, 567 F.2d at 219-20.
120. The Santa Fe opinion consisted of four parts. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. 465-80. The
footnote at issue in Goldberg appeared in part three of the Santa Fe opinion. See id. at 474.
121. Id. at 479.
122. See id. See also Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157, 162-64 (2d
Cir. 1971) (disparaging "mechanistic" interpretation of § 16(b) of 1934 Act and endorsing
focus on underlying policy considerations), affd sub nom. Kern County Land Co. v. Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1972); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 946 (2d Cir. 1969) (recognizing implied action for nontender-
ing shareholders under 1934 Act provisions governing tender offers); Brown v. Bullock,
294 F.2d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 1961) (en banc) (recognizing implied action under the Invest-
ment Company Act).
123. This Article uses judicial activism to refer to loose statutory construction and the
identification and creation of new rights on behalf of the legislature's chosen beneficiaries.
See supra text accompanying note 49.
124. 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
125. See id. at 868. For the text of § 10(b), see supra note 61.
126. 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967).
127. Section 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994).
128. See Barnes, 373 F.2d at 272-73.
129. Id. at 272-73 & n.2.
130. See id. at 271-72 (describing the difficulties).
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difficulties are not so ubiquitous as to render litigation under the section a
rarity. 31
The fact that Judge Friendly sometimes tempered his activism may
have worked to his reputational advantage. Commenting on rampant in-
consistency in the opinions of Justice Holmes, Judge Posner noted that
"once the world is convinced of a... thinker's merit despite the ambigui-
ties and equivocations of his work, those attributes enhance his fascina-
tion, provide occasions for research and debate, and magnify his
following."1 32
In short, Judge Friendly benefited from all the reputational advantages
that an era can bestow. He was a leading activist in an activist era that
precipitated significant and lasting changes.
III. JUDGE FRIENDLY'S COURT
How did membership on the Second Circuit affect Judge Friendly's
reputation in securities regulation? Recognized as the country's leading
commercial court during the 1940s and 1950s,133 the Second Circuit was
the ideal tribunal from which to write securities opinions during the criti-
cal period.134
The Second Circuit's advantages derived ultimately from the fact that it
heard appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York.' 35 The Southern District encompasses New York
City' 36-financial hub of the nation and situs of the New York and Amer-
ican Stock Exchanges and much of the securities industry. On the basis
of litigants' convenience, if nothing else, the Southern District was bound
131. See id. at 271-73 (by implication). For other examples of Friendly opinions falling
outside the activist mold, see Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d
Cir. 1966) (refusing to imply actions under stock exchange rules in all instances), cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Willheim v. Murchison, 342 F.2d 33, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1965) (refus-
ing to expand a definition under the Investment Company Act because of the lack of
evidence that Congress "gave any thought" to the matter at issue), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
840 (1965).
132. POSNER, supra note 19, at 62. To be sure, had Friendly been a knee-jerk activist,
he would have attracted attention as a "type." Cf. id. at 66. While this might have en-
hanced his conspicuousness, it would also have undoubtedly undermined his reputation for
thoughtfulness.
133. See John P. Frank, The Top U.S. Commercial Court, FORTUNE, Jan. 1951, at 92;
KARL LLEWELYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 48 (1960) (describing the Second Circuit
as "the most distinguished and admired bench in the United States"); Marvin Schick, Judi-
cial Relations on the Second Circuit, 1941-51, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 939, 940 & nn. 1-3 (1969)
(collecting tributes to the Second Circuit made during the 1940s and 1950s). See also J.
WOODWARD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A
STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS xix (1981) (noting
that the Second Circuit "has long been regarded as the nation's leading commercial
court").
134. The critical period runs from Nov. 8, 1961 to Mar. 23, 1977. See supra notes 76-77
and accompanying text.
135. The Southern District of New York is one of four judicial districts in the State of
New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). The Second Circuit encompasses the States of New
York, Connecticut, and Vermont. See id. § 41.
136. See id. § 112(b).
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to draw a disproportionate share of the country's major securities litiga-
tion during the critical period.137
Overseer of the Southern District of New York, the Second Circuit be-
came known as the "Mother Court" of securities regulation. 138 In prac-
tice this meant that it served as the "de facto Supreme Court" 139 on those
matters of securities regulation on which the de jure Supreme Court had
yet to pass.140 The transition from the leading commercial court to the
leading securities court was natural once securities regulation became an
important area of law in its own right.141
Table 1 sets forth the number of reported securities opinions that the
eleven federal appeals courts issued during the critical period. 142 As Ta-
ble 1 shows, the number that the Second Circuit produced (411) was
nearly five times the average of the other federal appeals courts (85). 143
Indeed, the Second Circuit's output of securities opinions represented al-
most one-third of the combined outputs of all eleven circuit courts.'"
TABLE 1
Securities Opinions of Federal Appeals Courts-Critical Period
Total all circuits: 1262
Circuit Ops. Circuit Ops. Circuit Ops.
D.C. 60 Fourth 28 Eighth 67
First 31 Fifth 174 Ninth 131
Second 411 Sixth 53 Tenth 106
Third 79 Seventh 122
Average of circuits outside Second: 85
137. The federal securities laws provide for nationwide service of process. See generally
X Loss & SELIGMAN, THIRD EDITION, supra note 45, at 4992-95.
138. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
139. Jan G. Deutch, Chiarella v. United States: A Study in Legal Style, 58 TEX. L. REV.
1291, 1299 (1980) (referring specifically to § 10(b)). Cf. Conference on Codification of the
Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 900 (1967) (comments of Judge Friendly) (not-
ing that "I suppose there is some sort of conclusive presumption that judges of the Second
Circuit where so much securities litigation is centered must know something about the
securities laws").
140. For illustrative securities issues on which the Supreme Court had yet to pass as of
the end of the critical period, see supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
141. For a discussion of the new importance of securities regulation as an area of law
during the critical period, see supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
142. The Eleventh Circuit, which was carved out of the Fifth Circuit, came into being in
1981. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorg. Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat.
1994 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994)).
143. The figures in Table 1 were generated by the following Westlaw search, conducted
separately for each federal court of appeals in its respective (CTA) file: ("securities act"
"securities exchange act" "investment advisors act" "investment company act" "public util-
ity holding company act" "trust indenture act" "securities investor protection act") and
da(aft 11/8/61 and bef 3/24/77). The figures are to some extent overinclusive, since no
attempt was made to eliminate any opinions containing securities references that were
merely extraneous, such as references by analogy. Cf. supra note 31.
144. In terms of overall caseload, the Second Circuit was smaller than the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits and only slightly larger than the District of Columbia and Fourth Circuits.
See DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP.
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Table 1 nonetheless probably understates the extent of the Second Cir-
cuit's dominance over securities regulation during the critical period.
Raw numbers of opinions cannot capture the fact that securities disputes
originating at the nation's financial epicenter were especially likely to be
significant. 145 Nor can raw numbers of opinions capture the respect that
the legal community accorded securities opinions of the Second
Circuit.
146
A more telling measure of the Second Circuit's hegemony during the
critical period comes from the choices made by authors of securities regu-
lation casebooks. Experts in their fields, casebook authors are charged
with determining which cases are sufficiently influential to warrant stu-
dent attention.147 As Table 2 shows, up to seventy percent of the federal
courts of appeals opinions appearing as principal cases in securities regu-
lation casebooks during the critical period came from the Second
Circuit.148
TABLE 2
Principal Cases in Securities Regulation Casebooks During the Critical
Period: Percentage of United States Circuit Court Opinions from
the Second Circuit
Casebook 2d Cir. Ops. Total Cir. Ops. % from 2d Cir.
Jennings (1st ed. 1963) 10 21 48%
Jennings (2d ed. 1968) 19 27 70%
Jennings (3d ed. 1972) 31 44 70%
Ratner (1st ed. 1975) 33 47 70%
Jennings (4th ed. 1977) 29 42 69%
Thus, service on the Second Circuit during the critical period provided
a cornucopia of reputational advantages. The Second Circuit's securities
docket was substantial both quantitatively and qualitatively. In addition,
its securities opinions commanded a degree of attention not accorded
those of any other court.
184-87 (1969) (comparing federal courts of appeals by number of cases commenced for
fiscal year ending 1969).
145. See Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securi-
ties Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice of Law" Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1799, 1812 (1992); Henry J. Friendly, Book Review, 86 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 473 (1971) (ob-
serving that the Second Circuit's securities opinions "have been particularly important be-
cause of its location at the seat of the country's principal financial market").
146. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
147. Cf. POSNER, supra note 19, at 90-91 (endorsing frequency of citation in casebooks
as a measure of judicial reputation but cautioning that "opinions are selected for inclusion
in casebooks for their teachability as well as for their intrinsic merit or their influence").
148. Table 2 includes only those casebooks published during the critical period for
which there is a current successor edition. It excludes opinions involving state securities
law only.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF PROFESSOR LOSS ON
JUDGE FRIENDLY
Judge Friendly was a contemporary of Harvard Law School's Professor
Louis Loss, this century's preeminent scholar of securities regulation.
149
Loss made a multifaceted contribution to Friendly's reputation.
A. THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE
Professor Loss served as the Reporter of the Federal Securities Code,
an ALI-sponsored endeavor intended to integrate all seven federal secur-
ities statutes150 into one comprehensive scheme.' 5 ' No mere cut and
paste of statutes already on the books, the Code made substantial altera-
tions in existing law.152 Completed between 1969 and 1978,153 and there-
after approved by the ABA 154 and the SEC,155 the Code probably would
have been introduced into Congress in 1981 had the Democrats not lost
control of the Senate in 1980.156
To assist him with the Code, Loss assembled a very distinguished group
of consultants and advisers. 157 Friendly was one of two United States
circuit judges and the only Second Circuit judge in the group.158 Other
members were leading academics, practitioners, and former chairmen of
the SEC.159 The group was not a mere showpiece.1 60 Beginning in 1969,
it "met several times yearly, for two or three days at a time, over a period
149. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
150. For a list of the seven federal securities statutes, see supra note 56.
151. Compare 1 A.L.I., FED. SEC. CODE XiX (1980) [hereinafter FED. SEC. CODE] (not-
ing the goal of integrating the six federal securities statutes enacted between 1933 and
1940) with id. at xxii (noting the assimilation into the Code of the Securities Investor Pro-
tection Act of 1970, enacted after work on the Code had begun).
152. See id. at xxvi-lvi (discussing changes in the law that the Code would bring about).
See also Louis Loss, Keynote Address: The Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1431, 1437-48 (1979) (same).
153. See 1 FED. SEC. CODE, supra note 151, at xxi-xxii.
154. See 65 A.B.A. J. 341 (1979).
155. See Statement Concerning Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, Exchange
Act Release No. 6242 [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,655 (Sept. 18,
1980).
156. See I Loss & SELIGMAN, THIRD EDITION, supra note 45, at 283. For Loss's own
account of the Code, see Loss, ANECDOTES, supra note 45, at 219-49. The Code spawned a
number of symposia. See, e.g., A Symposium on the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 1
PACE L. REV. 279 (1981); Fourth Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, 33 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1425 (1979) (symposium on the Code) [hereinafter Miami Symposium];
Symposium, The American Law Institute's Proposed Federal Securities Code, 32 VAND. L.
REV. 455 (1979).
157. The consultants and advisers were formally named by the ALI. See 1 FED. SEC.
CODE, supra note 151, at xxi. But as Reporter, Loss had a role in their selection. See Louis
Loss, The Current Status of SEC Codification, 26 Bus. LAW. 555, 556 (1971).
158. The other United States circuit judge was Thomas E. Fairchild of the Seventh Cir-
cuit. See 1 FED. SEC. CODE, supra note 151, at v.
159. For a complete list of the consultants and advisers, see 1 FED. SEC. CODE, supra
note 151, at v-vi.
160. Loss's own formulation was that it was a "decidedly no letterhead group." I FED.
SEC. CODE, supra note 151, at xxiv.
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of some eight years," 161 logging a total of "hundreds of hours" of work.' 62
While Judge Friendly made significant contributions to the Code, 163 he
also benefited considerably from his association with it. Indeed, the ex-
perience exposed him not only to the entire panoply of securities is-
sues,164 but also to the views of Professor Loss and other leading
experts.165 This education came at an ideal time: when work began on
the Code in the fall of 1969,166 Judge Friendly had yet to write most of his
critical period opinions. 167 Moreover, his connection with the Code likely
enhanced his standing as a securities expert among his Second Circuit
colleagues. This in turn probably increased the number of important se-
curities opinions that he was assigned to write. 168
B. JUDGE FRIENDLY'S OPINIONS
Judge Friendly's opinions contain numerous citations to Professor
Loss's treatise. 169 Yet these citations do not reflect the full extent of
Loss's contributions. Indeed, Loss edited important sentences' 70 and also
supplied ideas and modes of analysis for several key opinions for which
he received no attribution.171
This section examines Professor Loss's contributions to six of the
nineteen casebook opinions.172 The six may well be merely illustrative,
since much of the evidence for Loss's contributions comes from the
161. Ackerman et al., supra note 3, at 1722 (comments of Prof. Louis Loss).
162. Compare Loss, ANECDOTES, supra note 45, at 29 (describing the "hundreds of
hours" that the advisory group worked on the Code) with Ackerman et al., supra note 3, at
1722 (comments of Prof. Louis Loss) (recalling Friendly's "begging off [from a Code advi-
sory group meeting] just once ... for a dentist's appointment").
163. See Ackerman et al., supra note 3, at 1722 (comments of Prof. Louis Loss) (refer-
ring to Friendly's "invaluable participation" in the work of the Code).
164. For the Code's table of contents, see 1 FED. SEC. CODE, supra note 151, at xiii-xvi.
165. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
166. See 1 FED. SEC. CODE, supra note 151, at xxi.
167. For a list of Judge Friendly's securities opinions written during the critical period,
see infra Appendix II.
168. See infra notes 307, 314-17 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299, 1300 (2d Cir. 1973);
Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 874, 875, 876 (2d Cir. 1971); Rosenfeld v. Black,
445 F.2d 1337, 1342-43 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 409 U.S. 802 (1972); Barnes v. Osof-
sky, 373 F.2d 269, 272, 273 (2d Cir. 1967); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d
178, 181, 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
170. See infra notes 176-201 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 202-43 and accompanying text. During the 1940s, Second Circuit
Judges Clark and Frank disputed the appropriateness of consulting Yale Law School
faculty members about pending cases. See SCHICK, supra note 50, at 124-30. In a review of
Schick's book, Friendly characterized the Clark-Frank dispute as "pettiness." Henry J.
Friendly, Book Review, 86 POL. SCL Q. 470, 474 (1971). But see Archibald Cox, More
Learned than Witty, 7 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 501, 503 (1972) (reviewing SCHICK, supra
note 50) (characterizing the consultation dispute as one of many "continuing issues" over
which Judges Clark and Frank battled). See generally C.T. Harhut, Ex parte Communica-
tion Initiated by a Presiding Judge, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 673 (1995).
172. For a list of the casebook opinions, see infra Appendix I.
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Friendly Papers, 173 and those Papers contain many gaps. 174 Moreover, it
is likely that at least some opinion-related communications between the
two men were oral.175
1. Editing Important Sentences
Judge Friendly's opinions in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co. 1 7 6
and Goldberg v. Meridor177 were issued eleven years apart and addressed
entirely different issues. The two opinions nonetheless have something in
common: they were both edited by Professor Loss.
a. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.
Decided in 1966, Colonial Realty raised the question of whether to rec-
ognize implied actions under rules promulgated by stock exchanges. 178
In his opinion for the Second Circuit, Judge Friendly held that there was
no answer applicable in all cases. Instead, in each case the court must
consider "the nature of the particular rule and its place in the regulatory
scheme."179
In the Colonial Realty slip opinion of March 10, 1996, Judge Friendly
explained that to authorize implied actions under every stock exchange
rule "would saddle the federal courts with garden-variety customer-bro-
ker suits ... unless we were to make the large assumption that ... Con-
gress meant the federal courts to develop a new body of broker-customer
law." 180 As written, this explanation proved too much: whenever a court
implies an action under any stock exchange rule, it brings into being the
"new body of broker-customer law" that Friendly suggested Congress did
not intend. 81 Professor Loss-to whom Judge Friendly had sent a copy
of the slip opinion' 82-made this point in letters dated March 29183 and
173. See supra note 46.
174. For illustrative correspondence missing from the Friendly Papers, supra note 46,
see infra notes 182, 206.
175. Other than over the telephone, these communications could easily have occurred
face-to-face on the occasion of meetings of the Code's advisory group. See supra notes
157-62 and accompanying text.
176. 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
177. 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
178. Colonial Realty, 358 F.2d at 178.
179. Id. at 182.
180. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., No. 144, slip op. at 1227-28 (2d Cir. Mar. 10,
1966) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra
note 46, box 70, H.J.F. OPINIONS, 1965 term).
181. Similarly, the recognition of implied actions under Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9 created
new bodies of law on behalf of investors. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
182. The Friendly Papers do not contain a cover letter recording this transmittal. How-
ever, they do contain a letter from Loss to Friendly thanking Friendly for sending him a
copy of the Colonial Realty opinion. See Letter from Louis Loss to Henry J. Friendly 1
(Mar. 29, 1966) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Pa-
pers, supra note 46, box 98, folder 1).
183. See id. at 2.
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30.184 In a response dated April 1, 1966, Friendly concluded as follows:
"If you think some language changes would express these thoughts more
clearly, I would be delighted to have your suggestions."' 185 Professor Loss
replied in a letter dated April 7.186
Judge Friendly brought the matter to a head in an April 29 memoran-
dum to the other members of the Colonial Realty panel. 187 He reported
to his colleagues that as the consequence of an exchange of letters with
Professor Loss, he wanted to enlarge his explanation for why implication
of actions under stock exchange rules should not be automatic. 188 Previ-
ously he had stated that such implication "would saddle the federal courts
with garden-variety customer-broker suits ... unless we were to make the
large assumption that ... Congress meant the federal courts to develop a
new body of broker-customer law."'1 89 To that statement he now wished
to append the following qualification:
Although familiar principles require federal courts to do precisely
this as to those exchange rules whose violation is held to create a
federal claim, Congress scarcely contemplated judicial creation of a
new body of federal broker-customer law whenever the complaint in
what would otherwise be an action under state law alleged conduct
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade.190
The additional language-which became a part of the official opinion
published in West's Reporter' 91-represents a virtually verbatim use of a
formulation proffered by Professor Loss in his letter of April 7.192
b. Goldberg v. Meridor
Decided by the Second Circuit in 1977, Goldberg'93 put at issue the
meaning of the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries v.
Green.194 In Green, the Supreme Court held that Rule 10b-5 created a
184. See Letter from Louis Loss to Henry J. Friendly (Mar. 30, 1966) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 98, folder
1).
185. Letter from Henry J. Friendly to Louis Loss 2 (Apr. 1, 1966) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 98, folder
1).
186. See Letter from Louis Loss to Henry J. Friendly (Apr. 7, 1966) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 98, folder
1).
187. See Memorandum from H.J.F. (Apr. 29, 1966) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 13, Colonial Realty
folder).
188. See id.
189. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
190. Memorandum from H.J.F. (Apr. 29, 1966) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 13, Colonial Realty folder).
191. See Colonial Realty Corp., 358 F.2d at 183.
192. See Letter from Louis Loss to Henry J. Friendly 2 (Apr. 7, 1966) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 98, folder
1).
193. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069
(1978).
194. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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cause of action for fraud based on the omission or misrepresentation of
material information 195 but not for a mere lack of "fairness.' 196
Green notwithstanding, the Goldberg slip opinion contained language
suggesting that unfairness was violative of Rule 10b-5:
[W]e do not read Green as ruling that no action lies under Rule 10b-
5 when a controlling corporation causes a partly owned subsidiary to
sell its securities to the parent in an unfair transaction and fails to
make a disclosure, or, as can be alleged here, makes a misleading
disclosure. 197
The obscuring of Green's crucial distinction between fraud and unfairness
arguably failed to pay Green sufficient homage. Professor Loss, to whom
Judge Friendly had sent a copy of the slip opinion,198 made this point in a
letter dated September 14.199
In a September 23 memorandum to the other members of the
Goldberg panel, Judge Friendly acknowledged that the slip opinion's ref-
erence to an "unfair transaction" might have been unwise: "Professor
Loss has written me that while he entirely agrees with the decision, he
thinks it was unfortunate to use the words 'an unfair' [transaction] .... I
agree with his comment and would like to substitute the words 'a fraudu-
lent [transaction]. '"'200
Consistent with Judge Friendly's memorandum and Professor Loss's
suggestion, the official opinion published in West's Reporter reads:
[W]e do not read Green as ruling that no action lies under Rule 10b-
5 when a controlling corporation causes a partly owned subsidiary to
sell its securities to the parent in a fraudulent transaction and fails to
make a disclosure, or, as can be alleged here, makes a misleading
disclosure.201
2. Supplying Specific Ideas
Judge Friendly's 1968 concurring opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.20 2 contains specific ideas that appear to be derived from, but are not
attributed to, Professor Loss. These ideas come not only from the second
edition of Loss's treatise, published in 1961,203 but also from the three-
195. See id. at 474-77.
196. Id. at 478.
197. Goldberg v. Meridor, No. 77-7146, slip op. at 5818-19 (2d Cir. Sept. 8, 1977) (em-
phasis added) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers,
supra note 46, box 71, H.J.F. OPINIONS, 1976 Term).
198. See Letter from Henry J. Friendly to Louis Loss (Sept. 9, 1977) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 102, folder
108).
199. See Letter from Louis Loss to Henry J. Friendly 1 (Sept. 14, 1977) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 38,
Goldberg folder).
200. Memorandum from H.J.F. (Sept. 23, 1977) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 38, Goldberg folder).
201. Goldberg, 567 F.2d at 217-18 (emphasis added).
202. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
203. I-III Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45.
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volume supplement to the second edition published in 1969.204 Judge
Friendly had access to the supplement because Professor Loss mailed him
the page proofs.20 5
Indeed, Judge Friendly made two requests for the proofs while the
Texas Gulf Sulphur case was pending in the Second Circuit. In his first
request, he asked Professor Loss to send him the proofs pertaining to
Rule 10b-5.206 Since Texas Gulf Sulphur was an SEC action, Professor
Loss sent only those pages addressing Rule 10b-5 actions brought by the
SEC.207 Friendly wished to read the treatment of private Rule 10b-5 ac-
tions as well, however, and wrote again:
Many thanks for your promptness in sending me the pages of your
Supplement. While you have been more than generous, I would ap-
preciate also having the pages dealing with the remedial aspects of
Rule 10b-5 as applied to private litigation, since I do not think we
could deal intelligently with the instant case [Texas Gulf Sulphur]
without considering its effect in that field.20 8
Armed with the supplement as well as the treatise itself, Friendly made
far greater use of both than the express language of his concurrence
reveals.
Consider his discussion of whether a Rule 10b-5 plaintiff must prove
that the defendant acted with scienter. Judge Friendly pressed hard the
idea-endorsed by both the second edition 209 and its supplement 2 10-
that mere negligence is inconsistent with section 10(b): "It can, indeed,
be argued that ... Rule 10b-5(2), absent the reading in of a scienter re-
quirement, goes beyond the authority granted by [section] 10(b) of the
1934 Act. '211 Although his concurrence cites no authority for this
idea,212 his memorandum to the other members of the en banc court
reveals that the idea came from Professor Loss:
No one even intimates that the [press] release was not an honest
effort to attain a good objective .... [I]f clause (2) of Rule 10b-5
imposes liability in such a case, it goes beyond the powers vested in
the SEC by [section] 10(b). That is Professor Loss' view, p. 1766 [of
204. IV-VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45.
205. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text. Since the supplement to the second
edition was not yet in the public domain, neither the SEC nor any other party to the Texas
Gulf Sulphur litigation had the opportunity to argue that Loss was wrong. Any possible
questions about the propriety of Judge Friendly's consultation with Loss are outside the
scope of this Article. See also supra note 171.
206. The Friendly Papers do not contain a letter from Friendly making this request.
However, a subsequent letter from Friendly to Loss extends his "[many thanks for your
promptness in sending me the pages of your Supplement." Letter from Henry J. Friendly
to Louis Loss (May 27, 1968) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library as part of the
Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 59, Texas Gulf Sulphur folder).
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. See III Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 1766.
210. See VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3883-85.
211. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 868.
212. See id.
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the Second Edition], and I agree with it.2 13
Consider also Judge Friendly's discussion of whether to imply a private
action under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act,2 14 a close counterpart to Rule
10b-5.2 15 Marshalling the arguments that Congress had not meant to au-
thorize a private action under the section,2 16 he offered a construction of
the relevant legislative history217 in which he cited no authority other
than the legislative history itself.2 18 The construction offered by Friendly
appears verbatim in the supplement to Loss's second edition.2 19
3. Inspiring Modes of Analysis
a. The Extraterritorial Reach of Rule 10b-5
Rule 10b-5's extraterritorial reach was at issue in two casebook opin-
ions: Leasco Data Equipment Processing Corp. v. MaxwelP220 and Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.22 l The two opinions announced principles gov-
erning Rule 10b-5's extraterritoriality based on "what Congress would
have wished if these problems had occurred to it."2 22 The contents of this
"hypothetical legislative intent"2 23 came in part from the American Law
Institute's Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States,22 4 with which Friendly presumed that Congress would have
213. Memorandum from Henry J. Friendly 8 (May 8, 1968) (emphasis added) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 59,
Texas Gulf Sulphur folder).
Professor Loss had stated in pertinent part as follows in the passage to which Judge
Friendly referred:
It is perhaps open to serious question whether Clause (2) of the rule [10b-5],
which refers merely to material misstatements and half-truths without using
fraud or scienter language of any kind, is a permissible implementation of a
statutory provision which speaks in terms of "any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance." . . . Consequently .... the courts may read some sort
of watered-down scienter element into Clause (2) of Rule lob-5 in order to
avoid holding that clause to be ultra vires.
III Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 1766 (footnote omitted).
214. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994).
215. The language of Rule 10b-5 was adopted from that of § 17(a). See Loss & SELIG-
MAN, supra note 56, at 778-79.
216. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 867.
217. The construction was as follows:
When the House Committee Report listed the sections that "define the civil
liabilities imposed by the Act" it pointed only to [sections] 11 and 12 and
stated that "ttlo impose a greater responsibility [than that provided by sec-
tions 11 and 12] * * * would unnecessarily restrain the conscientious adminis-
tration of honest business with no compensating advantage to the public."
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. at 9-10 (1933)).
218. See id.
219. See VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3912. It is of course conceivable
that Loss borrowed this language from Friendly prior to finalizing the supplement.
220. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
221. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
222. Id. at 993.
223. Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. The Restatement (Second) has since been
supplanted. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987).
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wished the securities laws to be consistent.225 Shaping Rule 10b-5's extra-
territorial reach in accordance with hypothetical legislative intent and the
Restatement (Second)-a mode of analysis which at the time had no
caselaw precedent226-legitimated extending Rule 10b-5 to transactions
involving various foreign components, such as foreign plaintiffs and de-
fendants, foreign securities, and trades and misrepresentations made in
foreign countries.227 Such a broad reach probably would not have been
possible if a grounding in actual congressional intent had been perceived
to be necessary.
The inspiration for this mode of analysis may well have been the then
current second edition of Loss's treatise. The second edition not only
suggested the applicability of the Restatement (Second) to securities of-
fenses,228 but also justified extending the fraud provisions extraterritori-
ally on the basis of hypothetical legislative intent: "[lt is easier to ascribe
to Congress a purpose to prohibit the use of the United States as a base
from which to defraud her neighbors than an intention that every Cana-
dian buyer receive a statutory prospectus even though no offers are made
in the United States. '229
Indeed, even Professor Loss's phraseology-"base" and "neighbors"-
found its way into Judge Friendly's opinions. Thus, the Bersch opinion
observed that "Congress did not mean the United States to be used as a
base for fraudulent securities schemes even when the victims are foreign-
ers. '230 And in a securities opinion issued simultaneously with Bersch,
Judge Friendly opined that "[t]his country would surely look askance if
one of our neighbors stood by silently and permitted misrepresented se-
curities to be poured into the United States. '231
225. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 985, 987; Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1339.
226. Pre-Leasco opinions on Rule 10b-5's extraterritorial reach focused on actual con-
gressional intent. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200,206 (2d Cir.), modified
on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969);
Ferraioli v. Cantor, [1964-66 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 91,615, at 95, 310-
11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1965); Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). More-
over, a Westlaw search for securities opinions issued prior to Leasco reveals no opinions
that relied on the Restatement (Second).
The briefs in Leasco, at least as originally filed, largely ignored the question of extraterri-
toriality. Assigned to write the opinion, Judge Friendly spotted the importance of the ex-
traterritoriality question and caused the Second Circuit to direct the filing of additional
briefs addressing subject matter jurisdiction under "principles of international law" and the
1934 Act. See Supplemental Memorandum of H.J.F. (Nov. 17, 1971) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 27, Leasco
folder); Letter from Henry J. Friendly to Wilkie Farr & Gallagher (Nov. 19, 1971) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 27,
Leasco folder). Faced with the directive to address international law, the briefs did cite
Restatement (Second). But their focus was the actual-not the hypothetical-intent of
Congress. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Brief of Defendants-Appellees, Leasco (No.
71-1563).
227. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 974; Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1326.
228. See IV Loss, SECOND EDITON, supra note 45, at 2254.
229. I Loss, SECOND EDrrION, supra note 45, at 369.
230. Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987 (emphasis added) (citing lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975)).
231. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1017 (emphasis added).
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It is also possible that Professor Loss inspired Judge Friendly's analysis
of extraterritoriality otherwise than through the medium of the treatise.
The inspiration could have come instead-or in addition-through work
on the Code, which gave extraterritoriality considerable attention. 232 In
fact, Loss once said that he "like[s] to think" that discussions on extrater-
ritoriality within the Code advisory group had influenced Friendly's opin-
ions on this subject. 233
b. Notes as "Securities"
The casebook opinion in Exchange National Bank v. Touche Ross &
Co.234 addressed the issue of when a "note" qualified as a security under
the federal securities laws.235 There is reason to suppose that Loss in-
spired the mode of analysis proposed by Judge Friendly to resolve this
issue.
Exchange National Bank held that a note was presumptively a secur-
ity,236 but that the presumption of an investment could be rebutted if the
note bore a "strong family resemblance" to certain paradigmatic com-
mercial transactions. 237 Friendly derived this presumption by "recourse
to the statutory language": 238
The 1934 Act says that the term "security" includes "any note...
[excepting one] which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not
exceeding nine months," and the 1933 Act says that the term means
"any note" save for the registration exemption in [section] 3(a)(3).
These are the plain terms of both acts, to be applied "unless the con-
text otherwise requires. '239
None of the previous lower court opinions addressing when a note was a
security had given the statutory language comparable weight. 240
Judge Friendly's approach may well have been inspired by Professor
Loss. This supposition grows out of the similarities between Judge
Friendly's approach and the approach endorsed in the then current sec-
232. See 2 FED. SEC. CODE, supra note 151, at 981-1006 (text and commentary).
233. See Ackerman et al., supra note 3, at 1723-24 (comments of Prof. Louis Loss). For
a list of Judge Friendly's leading opinions on the extraterritorial reach of the federal securi-
ties laws, see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 56, at 1269 & n.1.
234. 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976).
235. Id.
236. See id. at 1137-38.
237. Id. at 1138 (setting forth the paradigmatic commercial transactions). See also
Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir.) (adding a commer-
cial transaction), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
238. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 544 F.2d at 1137.
239. Id.
240. In the wake of Exchange National Bank, lower federal courts outside the Second
Circuit rejected Friendly's approach as excessively literal. See, e.g., American Fletcher
Mortgage Co. v. United States Steel Credit Corp., 635 F.2d 1247, 1254 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981). For an overview of the approaches taken by the other circuits,
see Janet Kerr & Karen M. Eisenhauer, Reves Revisited, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1123, 1124-29
(1992). In 1988, the Supreme Court purported to adopt the Exchange National Bank ap-
proach. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 65 (1990). In the view of commentators,
however, Reves's adoption of the Exchange National Bank approach was more apparent
than real. See, e.g., Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 56, at 176.
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ond edition of Loss's treatise. Professor Loss focused on statutory lan-
guage in analyzing whether the federal securities laws apply to a
borrower who fraudulently obtains a loan from a bank and gives a note in
exchange: "[I]t is difficult to say whether the borrower has violated the
antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts .... Under a literal read-
ing the answer would seem to be yes. But . . . the definitions-of
both 'security' and 'sale'- . . . apply 'unless the context otherwise
requires.'"241
Professor Loss may have inspired Judge Friendly's approach to notes in
ways other than through the medium of his treatise. The inspiration
could again have come from Loss's work on the Code, which specifically
addressed the treatment of notes.242 Indeed, in a memorandum to the
other members of the Exchange National Bank panel, Judge Friendly ob-
served that Professor Loss and the Code advisory group had had "ex-
tended discussion" about the circumstances that would render a note a
security.243
C. PROFESSOR Loss's TREATISE
The authoritative reference work in securities regulation since the pub-
lication of the first edition in 1951,24 Professor Loss's treatise had the
potential to influence Judge Friendly's reputation. How did its portrayal
of Judge Friendly's opinions compare with its portrayal of the work of
other judges? This question is especially intriguing given that Professor
Loss had himself contributed to some of the Friendly opinions that his
treatise discussed.245
The appropriate focus of attention is the second edition of the treatise,
which was published in three volumes in 1961246 and amplified by a three-
volume supplement in 1969.247 A beacon throughout the critical pe-
241. I Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 546.
242. See 1 FED. SEC. CODE, supra note 151, § 202(150)(B)(iii) & cmt. 6.
243. Memorandum from H.J.F. 2 (Apr. 8, 1976) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 23, Exchange National Bank
folder).
244. Loss, FIRST EDITION, supra note 45. See William 0. Douglas, Book Review, 40
CALIF. L. REV. 636 (1951) (comparing Loss's treatise to Wigmore's treatise on evidence);
Mark A. Sargent, A Sense of Order: The Virtues and Limits of Doctrinal Analysis, 104
HARV. L. REV. 634, 635 (1990) (noting that the first and second editions of Loss's treatise
"virtually defined the nascent field of securities law"); A. A. Sommer, Jr., Book Review, 46
Bus. LAW. 1895, 1901 (1991) (describing the first, second, and third editions of Loss's trea-
tise as "the most authoritative source of interpretation of the federal securities laws
extant").
245. Professor Loss contributed to Friendly's opinions in Colonial Realty Corp. v.
Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966), and SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). See supra notes 178-92, 202-19 and accompanying text. Both of these
opinions were discussed in the second edition of Loss's treatise. See infra notes 270-72 and
accompanying text.
246. Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45.
247. Id.
1997]
SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
riod,248 the second edition did not give way to a third edition until
1989,249 at which point Judge Friendly was deceased and his reputation
firmly established.250
To compare the portrayal of Friendly and non-Friendly opinions,
a manageable sample of significant opinions had to be created. 251 The
sample consisted of the principal cases252 included in the 1972 edi-
tion of the Jennings and Marsh securities regulation casebook 253
and decided prior to December 1, 1968-the date up to which the
second edition was current. 254 The sample encompassed opinions
of the Supreme Court,255 federal appeals courts, 256 and federal
248. A Westlaw search reveals that Loss's treatise was cited in 584 opinions during the
critical period. The critical period runs from Nov. 8, 1961 to Mar. 23, 1977. See supra text
accompanying notes 76-77.
249. Loss & SELIGMAN, THIRD EDITION, supra note 45.
250. The third edition may help to maintain Judge Friendly's reputation. But the main-
tenance of his reputation is beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note 41 and accom-
panying text.
251. The second edition does not contain an index of judges. Moreover, the Tables of
Cases contain hundreds of entries, far more than can feasibly be examined. See III Loss,
SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 2039-99; VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at
4163-4251.
252. For the definition of "principal cases," see supra note 39. Principal cases decided
by state courts were not considered.
253. This casebook was used because it is the only casebook existing at the time of
publication of the supplement to the second edition that also has a present-day successor
edition.
254. See IV Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at vi. The only principal case from
the Jennings & Marsh casebook that did not appear in Loss's Tables of Cases was United
States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968) (Woodbury, J., sitting by designation), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969).
255. The Supreme Court opinions were SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S.
202 (1967); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341
(1963); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia.
ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320
U.S. 344 (1943).
256. The federal appeals court opinions were Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d
Cir. 1968) (Kaufman, J.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (Waterman, J.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); id. at 864
(Friendly, J., concurring); id. at 869 (Kaufman, J., concurring); id. (Anderson, J., concur-
ring); id. (Hays, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 870 (Moore, J., dissent-
ing); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968) (Medina, J.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969); id. at 917 (Moore, J., dissenting); Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co.,
401 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968) (Schnackenberg, J.); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384
F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) (Feinberg, J.); id. at 548 (Moore, J., dissenting in part); Chemical
Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967) (Lumbard, J.); United States v.
Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.) (Sobeloff, J.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850
(1967); Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.); Colonial Realty Corp.
v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966);
Merritt Vickers, Inc. v. SEC, 353 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1965) (Moore, J.); B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v.
Lachner, 332 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964) (Kaufman, J.); Willheim v. Murchison, 342 F.2d 33 (2d
Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965); Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116 (10th
Cir. 1963) (Murrah, J.); Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963) (Marshall, J.); Kahn v.
SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961) (Marshall, J.); id. at 114 (Clark, J., concurring in the
result); Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.); id. at 423 (Moore, J.,
dissenting); SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.) (Moore, J.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 819 (1960); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.) (Lumbard, J.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) (Stephens, J.);
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district courts,2 57 and included five opinions authored by Judge
Friendly.258
Consider first the portrayal of the non-Friendly opinions. Supreme
Court opinions aside, 25 9 the judge who authored the opinion was in most
instances not identified.2 60 Instead, the holding or distinction in question
was attributed simply to "the court" or to the specific circuit.2 61 This was
so even where the opinion was quoted or otherwise presented as
sound.2 62 Moreover, some of the named judges might have preferred an-
onymity, given what was said about their opinions. For example, an opin-
ion by Judge Lumbard was said to "leave a number of perplexing
questions 12 63 and one by Judge Moore was said to produce "uncertainty"
and "danger. '1264 Moreover, with the exception of three federal district
Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (per curiam);
id. at 884 (Frank, J., dissenting); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.)
(A. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass'n,
120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.) (A. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941); id. at 742 (Swan, J.,
dissenting).
257. The federal district court opinions were Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (McLean, J.); Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(Bonsai, J.); Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) (Dooling, J.);
Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (Connell, J.); SEC v. Midwest
Technical Dev. Corp., 11961-64 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 91,252 (D.
Minn. July 5, 1963) (Nordbye, J.); Winter v. D.J. & M. Inv. & Constr. Corp., 185 F. Supp.
943 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (Byrne, J.); United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) (Sugarman, J.); United States v. Robertson, 181 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (Her-
lands, J.); Wilko v. Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (Bicks, J.); Joseph v. Farnsworth
Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (Sugarman, J.), aff'd, 198 F.2d
883 (2d Cir. 1952); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949) (Wyzan-
ski, J.).
258. The opinions by Judge Friendly were SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
864 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Barnes v.
Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Willheim v. Murchison, 342 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965); Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
259. For a list of the Supreme Court opinions, see supra note 255.
260. For those lower court judges who were named, see infra notes 263-66 and accom-
panying text.
261. See, e.g., V Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3502 (discussing Berko v.
SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963)); id. at 3045 (discussing B.T. Babbitt, Inc. v. Lachner, 332
F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1964)); I Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 1774 (discussing
Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953)); id. at 1469 (discussing Birnbaum v. New-
port Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952)); 1 Loss, SECOND
EDITION, supra note 45, at 550-51 (discussing SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass'n,
120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941)).
262. See, e.g., V Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3502 (discussing Berko v.
SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963)); I Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 550-51
(discussing SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass'n, 120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 618 (1941)).
263. V Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3057 (discussing Chemical Fund, Inc.
v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967)).
264. I Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 650, 651 (discussing SEC v. Guild Films
Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960)). Similarly, Judge Clark was
said to have "overstated ... [a particular] proposition." See VI Loss, SECOND EDITION,
supra note 45, at 3712 (discussing Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961)). Moreover,
Judge Bonsai was described as having "left ... camp before the end of the battle." VI
Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3640 (discussing Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60
(S.D.N.Y. 1967)). Also, Judge Wyzanski was criticized for the "implicit assumptions"
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judges-two of whom received criticism 26 5-no judge of a lower federal
court was named more than once in connection with a given opinion.2
66
Now consider the portrayal of the five Friendly opinions.2 67 All were
quoted or otherwise presented as sound.2 68 Judge Friendly was specifi-
cally identified as the author of four of the opinions.2 69 Moreover, he is
named three and four times each, respectively, in connection with his
made in his opinion in Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949). See
II Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 996 n.521.
265. The three federal district judges named more than once in connection with a par-
ticular opinion are Judges Bonsai, McLean, and Wyzanski. For mention of Judge Bonsai,
see VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3639-40 (discussing Entel v. Allen, 270 F.
Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)). For criticism of the Entel opinion, see id. at 3640. For mention
of Judge Wyzanski, see II Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 995-96, 1264 (discuss-
ing Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949)). For criticism of the
Remar opinion, see id. at 996 n.521. For mention of Judge McLean, see VI Loss, SECOND
EDITION, supra note 45, at 3849, 3856 (discussing Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
266. Nine lower court judges were mentioned once in connection with a particular opin-
ion. For mention of Judge Clark, see VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3712
(discussing Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J. concurring)). For mention
of Judge Connell, see VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3837 (discussing Len-
nerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964)). For mention of Judge Dooling,
see V Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 2936 (discussing Laurenzano v. Einbender,
264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966)). For mention of Judge Feinberg, see VI Loss, SECOND
EDITION, supra note 45, at 3875 (discussing Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d
540 (2d Cir. 1967)). For mention of Judge Frank, see III Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra
note 45, at 1792 (discussing Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F.2d 883,
884 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., dissenting)). For mention of Judge Lumbard, see V Loss,
SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3056 (discussing Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp.,
377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967)). For mention of Judge Medina, see VI Loss, SECOND EDI-
TION, supra note 45, at 3887 (discussing Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969)). For mention of Judge Moore, see I Loss, SECOND EDITION,
supra note 45, at 648 (discussing SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960)); VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3617 (discussing
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 548 (2d Cir. 1967) (Moore, J., dissent-
ing)); VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3645 (discussing SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 870 (2d Cir. 1968) (Moore, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969)); V Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 2900 (discussing Brown v. Bul-
lock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1968) (Moore, J., dissenting)). For mention of Judge Waterman,
see VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3544 (discussing SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
267. For a list of these opinions, see supra note 258.
268. For discussion of Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967), see V Loss, SEC-
OND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3850-51. For discussion of Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache
& Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966), see VI Loss, SECOND
EDITION, supra note 45, at 2887-89, 2956. For discussion of Brown v. Bullock, 294 F. 2d
Cir. 415 (2d Cir. 1961), see V Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 2899-2900. For
discussion of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), see VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note
45, at 3639, 3644-45, 3895, 3913. For discussion of Willheim v. Murchison, 342 F.2d 33 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965), see IV Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45,
at 2557; V Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 2699-2700, 2702.
269. Judge Friendly is not identified as the author of the opinion in Willheim v. Murchi-
son, 342 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965). For discussion of the
Willheim opinion, see IV Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 2557; V Loss, SECOND
EDITION, supra note 45, at 2699-2700, 2702, 2902.
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opinions in Colonial Realty270 and Texas Gulf Sulphur271-the only two
opinions in the sample with which Professor Loss is known to have
assisted. 272
Based on the sample, it appears that Judge Friendly benefited from the
portrayal of his opinions in the second edition of Professor Loss's trea-
tise. The combination of positive portrayals of his opinions and repeated
mention of his name conveyed the message that he was important. Be-
cause he wrote a large number of opinions,2 73 this message gained in
strength.
Consider finally Professor Loss's treatment of Judge Friendly's opin-
ions outside the sample-opinions written prior to December 1, 1968274
but not included as principal cases in the 1972 Jennings and Marsh
casebook.275 There were twenty such majority opinions,276 nineteen of
which received at least some mention in the Loss treatise. 277 All were
presented as sound in result,278 although one was mildly criticized for its
270. See V Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 2887-88, 2956.
271. See VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3639, 3644-45, 3895, 3913.
272. See supra notes 178-92, 202-19 and accompanying text.
273. No lower court judge authored more of the sample opinions than Judge Friendly.
See supra notes 256-57. For a discussion of the quantity of Friendly's securities opinions,
see infra part V.
274. This is the date up to which the second edition of the Loss treatise was current.
See supra text accompanying note 254.
275. For the parameters of the sample, see supra notes 252-58 and accompanying text.
276. The twenty opinions were the following: SEC v. General Time Corp., 407 F.2d 65
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403
F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); Donlon Indus. v. Forte, 402 F.2d
935 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. Talley Indus., 399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1015 (1969); Bruns Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968); SEC v. Sterling Precision Corp., 393 F.2d 214 (2d
Cir. 1968); Phillips v. SEC, 388 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.
1968); Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966); Fox v. Glickman Corp., 355
F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966); United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d
715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965); SEC v. Canandaigua Enters. Corp., 339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964);
United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); Phelps
v. Burnham, 327 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1964); Katz v. Kilsheimer, 327 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1964);
United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1963); United States
v. Crosby, 314 F.2d 654 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 923 (1963); Chabot v. National Sec.
& Research Corp., 290 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Guterma, 281 F.2d 742 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871 (1960).
277. The only opinion that did not appear in Loss's Table of Cases was Katz v. Kil-
sheimer, 327 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1964).
278. For discussion of SEC v. General Time Corp., 407 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969), see V-VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 2903,
3621, 3622-23. For discussion of General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969), see V-VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45,
at 2865, 2870, 2903, 3621, 3622. For discussion of Donlon Indus. v. Forte, 402 F.2d 935 (2d
Cir. 1968), see VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3913, 3991. For discussion of
SEC v. Talley Indus., 399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, see VI Loss, SECOND EDI-
TION, supra note 45, at 4060, 4078. For discussion of Bruns Nordeman & Co. v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968), see VI
Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 4143. For discussion of SEC v. Sterling Precision
Corp., 393 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1968), see V-VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at
3059-60, 3571, 4067. For discussion of Phillips v. SEC, 388 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1968), see V
Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 2697, 2705. For discussion of SEC v. Frank, 388
SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
reasoning.279 Friendly was specifically identified as the author of eight of
the nineteen opinions280 and was named three times in connection with
one of them. 281 This attentiveness to Judge Friendly-while admittedly
somewhat less than in the sample 282-is nonetheless not inconsistent with
the sample results. Indeed, since opinions outside the sample were not
selected for inclusion as principal cases, 283 as a group they are probably
less worthy of note than those in the sample.
In short, Professor Loss contributed to Judge Friendly's opinions and
gave them favorable and conspicuous mention in his treatise. In addition,
he provided Friendly with an incomparable education through the me-
dium of the Code. The conclusion that Loss enhanced Friendly's reputa-
tion seems inescapable.
F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968), see VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 4110, 4114, 4119.
For discussion of Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966), see V-VI Loss,
SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, 2830, 2840, 2925-26, 4115. For discussion of Fox v. Glick-
man Corp., 355 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966), see VI Loss,
SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3825, 3962. For discussion of United States v. Doyle,
348 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965), see VI Loss, SECOND EDITION,
supra note 45, at 4123-24, 4136-37. For discussion of Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 954 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965), see VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, 3969-70.
For discussion of SEC v. Canandaigua'Enters. Corp., 339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964), see V
Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 2690, 2691-93. For discussion of United States v.
Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964), see IV-V Loss, SECOND
EDITION, supra note 45, at 2379, 3373. For discussion of Phelps v. Burnham, 327 F.2d 812
(2d Cir. 1964), see VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3990. For discussion of
United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894 (1963), see VI Loss,
SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3549, 3708, 3711. For discussion of United States v.
Crosby, 314 F.2d 654 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 923 (1963), see VI Loss, SECOND
EDITION, supra note 45, at 3533. For discussion of Chabot v. National Sec. & Research
Corp., 290 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1961), see VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3991.
For discussion of United States v. Guterma, 281 F.2d 742 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
871 (1960), see II, III & V Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 1040,1097, 1101, 1991,
1992, 1993, 3059.
279. For criticism of Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966), see V
Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 2925-26.
280. See VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 4115 (identifying Judge Friendly
as the author of Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966)); VI Loss, SEC-
OND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3622-23 (identifying Judge Friendly as the author of SEC v.
General Time Co., 407 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969)); VI Loss,
SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 4119 (identifying Judge Friendly as the author of SEC
v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968)); V Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3059-60
(identifying Judge Friendly as the author of SEC v. Sterling Precision Corp., 393 F.2d 214
(2d Cir. 1968)); VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 4136-37 (identifying Judge
Friendly as the author of United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 843 (1965)); VI Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 3708 (identifying Judge
Friendly as the author of United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
894 (1963)); V Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 2690, 2691 (identifying Judge
Friendly as the author of SEC v. Canandaigua Enters. Corp., 339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964));
IV Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 2379 (identifying Judge Friendly as the author
of United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964)).
281. See V Loss, SECOND EDITION, supra note 45, at 2690 (identifying Judge Friendly
as the author of SEC v. Canandaigua Enters. Corp., 339 F.2d at 14 (2d Cir. (1964)); id. at
2691 (two mentions of Judge Friendly's authorship of Canandaigua on this page).
282. See supra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
283. For the parameters of the sample, see supra notes 252-58 and accompanying text.
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V. THE QUANTITY OF JUDGE FRIENDLY'S
SECURITIES OPINIONS
Professor Loss once mused that Judge Friendly had "probably written
more SEC opinions than most ... other judges combined. '284 Was Loss's
speculation accurate? If so, what were the reputational consequences for
Friendly? And how did Judge Friendly come to write so many securities
opinions in the first place?
A. A COMPARISON OF JUDGE FRIENDLY AND His COLLEAGUES
A total of twenty-one judges served on the Second Circuit for at least
some portion of the critical period.285 Table 3 sets forth their respective
outputs of securities opinions during that period.286 Only majority opin-
ions of three-judge panels are included. 287
As Table 3 shows, Judge Friendly produced far more securities opin-
ions than did the other judges. His output of fifty-six such opinions was
more than triple the outputs of sixteen of his colleagues 288 and more than
double the outputs of the remaining four.289 He surpassed not only the
thirteen judges who served for a portion of the critical period 290 but also
the seven judges who, like him, served for the entire period.291
Judge Friendly derived reputational benefits from the sheer quantity of
securities opinions that he produced. One was the accentuation of his
visibility in the securities regulation area. Another was the opportunity
to develop an expertise in securities regulation. In turn, that expertise
could only have improved the quality of his opinions, thereby further en-
hancing his reputation.
284. Panel Discussion, Miami Symposium, supra note 156, at 1522 (comments of Prof.
Loss).
285. This figure does not include Judge Chase, who was listed as a Second Circuit judge
until 1969. 417 F.2d IX & n.1 (noting his death on Nov. 17, 1969). However, the date of
his last published opinion was 1957. United States v. Johnson, 247 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 867 (1957).
286. The figures in Table 3 were determined in a two-step process. The first step in-
volved culling from Westlaw's file of Second Circuit cases (CTA2) each judge's majority
opinions that contained references to at least one of the seven federal securities statutes,
which are listed supra note 56. The second step involved eliminating any opinions in which
the securities references were merely extraneous, such as references by analogy. Also
eliminated were duplicate opinions, one-judge orders, concurrences, dissents, and en banc
opinions.
287. Concurrences, dissents, and en banc opinions were excluded. See supra note 286.
288. The sixteen were Judges Anderson, Clark, Feinberg, Gurfein, Hays, Hincks, Mans-
field, Marshall, Medina, Meskill, Mulligan, Oakes, Smith, Swan, Van Graafeiland, and
Waterman.
289. The four were Judges Lumbard, Kaufman, Moore, and Timbers.
290. The thirteen were Judges Anderson, Clark, Feinberg, Gurfein, Hincks, Mansfield,
Marshall, Meskill, Mulligan, Oakes, Swan, Timbers, and Van Graafeiland.
291. The seven were Judges Hays, Kaufman, Lumbard, Medina, Moore, Smith, and
Waterman,
1997]
SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
TABLE 3
Securities Opinions of 2d Cir. Judges During the Critical Period
Judge Ops. Judge Ops. Judge Ops.
Hincks 1 Gurfein 8 * Waterman 16
Meskill 2 Anderson 9 * Smith 17
Swan 2 Mansfield 10 * Lumbard 20
Van Graafeiland 2 * Medina 11 * Kaufman 23
Clark 3 Oakes 13 * Moore 25
Marshall 4 Feinberg 14 Timbers 25
Mulligan 6 * Hays 16 * Friendly 56
• Indicates service throughout the critical period.
B. EXPLAINING JUDGE FRIENDLY'S DISPROPORTIONATE OUTPUT
How did Judge Friendly come to write more securities opinions than
his colleagues? Focusing on him and the seven other Second Circuit
judges who served throughout the critical period, this section tests three
possible hypotheses.
1. Panel Assignments
United States circuit judges hear cases in panels of three,2 92 to which
they are assigned by their court's chief judge.2 93 Only members of the
panel that hear a case are eligible to write the opinion deciding it.294 Per-
haps Judge Friendly wrote more securities opinions than his colleagues
because he heard more securities cases than they did.
Table 4 sets forth the number of securities cases2 95 and total cases
heard during the critical period by Judge Friendly and his colleagues that
culminated in published opinions.296 Also set forth is the percentage of
each judge's total cases that his securities cases represented.
Table 4 provides at least some support for the hypothesis that Judge
Friendly's disproportionate output of securities opinions is traceable to
the number of securities cases that he heard. To be sure, he did not hear
an appreciably greater percentage of securities cases than did his col-
leagues.2 97 But consider the fact that Judge Friendly heard 110 securities
cases, a number more than 1.5 times greater than the 68.2 securities cases
that his colleagues averaged. Thus, he had more opportunities than his
292. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1994). A case can be considered en banc if a majority of the
court's active judges so decides. See id.
293. Cf. id. U.S.C. § 45(b) & 46(a).
294. See id. U.S.C. § 46(c).
295. A securities case was a case in which the opinion deciding it referred to one of the
seven federal securities statutes, which are listed supra note 56. Where the securities refer-
ence was extraneous, such as a reference by analogy, the case was excluded.
296. No account is taken of cases heard which did not culminate in published opinions.
The resultant data are nonetheless instructive, since the fact of publication evidences the
importance of the legal issues presented. See Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions on Publica-
tion and Citation of Judicial Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 119, 134-37
(1994).
297. No judge had a percentage below four, and four judges had a percentage of five.
Thus, Judge Friendly's six percent figure does not seem especially out of line.
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colleagues to write securities opinions.298
TABLE 4
Securities Cases and Total Cases Heard During the Critical Period by
Second Circuit Judges Who Served Throughout that Period
Judge Sees. Cases Total Cases % Secs. Cases
Waterman 62 1468 4
Kaufman 67 1548 4
Smith 77 1769 4
Lumbard 82 1803 5
Medina 18 380 5
Moore 82 1701 5
Hays 90 1712 5
Friendly 110 1947 6
Average no. of secs. cases for judges other than Friendly: 68.2
2. Overall Productivity
Perhaps Judge Friendly's disproportionate output of securities opinions
can be explained by reference to his general productivity. If so, he would
have to have written not only more securities opinions than his colleagues
but also more opinions overall.
Table 5 presents the average yearly outputs of opinions for Judge
Friendly and his colleagues during the critical period. Only majority
opinions of three-judge panels are included.299
The table provides at least some support for the productivity hypothe-
sis. Indeed, Judge Friendly wrote an average of 36.3 opinions per year,
whereas his colleagues averaged 24.2 opinions per year. His output thus
exceeded that of his colleagues by 33%, a figure that drops to 26% upon
the exclusion of Judge Medina, who wrote far fewer opinions than the
others.300
298. The literature on panel assignments is sparse. After studying the Second, Fifth,
and D.C. Circuits for the years 1965-67, Professor Howard concluded that "there was more
evidence of nonrandom panel assignment than the judges admitted or perhaps perceived."
HOWARD, supra note 133, at 239. In a study of the Fifth Circuit between 1961-63, Profes-
sors Atkins and Zavoina found evidence of panel manipulation in race-related cases. See
Burton M. Atkins & William Zavoina, Judicial Leadership of the Court of Appeals: A
Probability Analysis of Panel Assignment in Race Relations Cases on the Fifth Circuit, 18
AM. J. POL. Sci. 701, 701 (1974).
299. After each judge's opinions were obtained from Westlaw, his concurring, dissent-
ing, and en banc opinions were excluded, as were any duplicate opinions and one-judge
orders.
300. Judge Medina assumed senior status on March 1, 1958. 250 F.2d VIII & n.1. Con-
sistent with that status he did not have to work full-time. See Wilfred Feinberg, Senior
Judges: A National Resource, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 409, 410 (1990).
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TABLE 5
Average Number of Opinions Written per Year During the Critical
Period by Second Circuit Judges Serving Throughout that Period
Judge Yearly Av. Judge Yearly Av.
Medina 9 Moore 28.1
Waterman 22.1 Lumbard 29.4
Kaufman 23.6 Smith 29.7
Hays 27.9 Friendly 36.3
Average for judges other than Friendly: 24.2
Yet Judge Friendly's general productivity does not fully explain his dis-
proportionate output of securities opinions. Consider the average yearly
number of securities opinions written by Friendly and his colleagues dur-
ing the critical period, which are set out in Table 6.30 1 As Table 6 shows,
Friendly's colleagues averaged 1.2 securities opinions per year, a fact sug-
gesting that Friendly-whose overall output of opinions was 33% larger
than theirs3 2-could be expected to write 1.6 securities opinions per
year. But Friendly wrote a striking 3.8 securities opinions per year-
more than three times his colleagues' average.
TABLE 6
Average Yearly Number of Securities Opinions Written During the
Critical Period by Second Circuit Judges Serving Throughout that Period
Judge Yearly Av. Judge Yearly Av.
Medina .7 Lumbard 1.3
Hays 1.1 Kaufman 1.5
Waterman 1.1 Moore 1.7
Smith 1.1 Friendly 3.8
Average for judges other than Friendly: 1.2
3. Opinion Assignments
Opinions are assigned by the panel's presiding judge-the member in
active service with the longest tenure on the court.303 Thus, Judge
Friendly may have written more securities opinions than his colleagues
did because presiding judges (perhaps including Friendly himself 30 4) were
more likely to assign them to him than to others.
Table 7 sets forth each judge's securities opinions as a percentage of his
total opinions. Only majority opinions of three-judge panels are
included.305
301. For the method of determining securities opinions, see supra note 286.
302. See supra text accompanying note 300.
303. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994).
304. Cf. SCHICK, supra note 50, at 82 (noting that "[tihere may be some tendency for
the presiding judge to assign to himself a disproportionate number of important
opinions ... ").
305. See supra notes 286, 299 and accompanying text.
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The table provides support for the assignment explanation. Securities
opinions represented, on average, five percent of the opinions written by
Judge Friendly's colleagues, whereas they represented ten percent of the
opinions written by Judge Friendly himself. While Judge Medina's per-
centage was eight, he wrote far fewer opinions-as well as far fewer se-
curities opinions -than did the others.30 6
TABLE 7
Securities Opinions and Total Opinions Written During the Critical
Period by Second Circuit Judges Who Served Throughout that Period
Judge Sees. Ops. Total Ops. % Judge Secs. Ops. Total Ops. %
Smith 16 445 4 Moore 24 421 6
Hays 16 418 4 Kaufman 23 354 6
Lumbard 20 441 4 Medina 11 135 8
Waterman 16 332 5 Friendly 57 545 10
Average for judges other than Friendly: 5%
Why were presiding judges inclined to turn to Judge Friendly when it
came to securities opinions? The reason cannot simply be that they re-
garded him highly, since that would not account for his disproportionate
share of securities opinions in particular. The next section proposes an
alternative explanation.
C. EXPLAINING JUDGE FRIENDLY'S OPINION ASSIGNMENTS
Presiding judges probably assigned Judge Friendly a disproportionate
share of securities opinions for three reasons: he was (1) interested in
securities regulation; (2) an expert in the subject area; and (3) senior to
many of his colleagues at a relatively early stage of his judicial career.
Interest, expertise, and seniority weigh heavily with presiding judges in
assigning opinions.307
Judge Friendly made known his general interest in the securities area
by serving as adviser to the ALI's Federal Securities Code. 308 Moreover,
it appears that he also expressed interest in writing specific majority opin-
ions. On the Second Circuit, such interest could be communicated by a
long voting memorandum3 9-a document by which a judge indicates to
his fellow panel members how he expects to vote on a particular case and
306. See supra text accompanying note 300. Others have found evidence of subject
matter specialization among judges. See HOWARD, supra note 133, at 234; Burton M. At-
kins, Opinion Assignments on the United States Courts of Appeals: The Question of Issue
Specialization, 27 W. POL. Q. 409, 409 (1974).
307. See, e.g., HOWARD, supra note 133, at 234-35 (noting the roles of interest, seniority,
and expertise); id. at 249 (seniority); id. at 250 (expertise); id. at 255-56 (seniority, interest,
and expertise); SCHICK, supra note 50, at 101 (noting the roles of interest and expertise).
308. See supra text accompanying notes 150-68.
309. See Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit, 14 HOF-
STRA L. REv. 297, 301 (1986).
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the reasons for so voting.310 Voting memoranda were typically one to
two pages long.311 It may therefore be noteworthy that for casebook
opinions that were majority opinions of three-judge panels, 312 Friendly's
voting memoranda averaged 4.1 pages.313
As the only Second Circuit judge to serve as an adviser to the ALI's
Federal Securities Code, 314 Friendly had become conversant not only
with the entire panoply of securities issues31 5 but also with the views held
by leading securities regulation experts. 316 Moreover, his expertise was
undoubtedly to some extent self-perpetuating because the more securities
opinions he wrote-whether based on his expertise or interest or a com-
bination of both-the more additional expertise he acquired. Further-
more, his perceived expertise was likely accentuated by his highly
favorable portrayal in Professor Loss's treatise. 317
310. For discussion of voting memoranda, see id. at 298-303; Gerald Gunther, Reflec-
tions on Judicial Administration in the Second Circuit, from the Perspective of Learned
Hand's Days, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 505, 509 (1994) (noting that Second Circuit judges used
voting memoranda less often after 1986).
311. Feinberg, supra note 309, at 299.
312. The casebook opinions included not only majority opinions of three-judge panels
but also concurring, dissenting, and en banc opinions. For a list of the casebook opinions,
see infra Appendix I.
313. This figure represents the average of the voting memoranda available in the
Friendly Papers for the casebook opinions that were majority opinions of three-judge
panels. See Memorandum of H.J.F. (June 10, 1977) (3 pages) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 38, Goldberg folder)
(casebook opinion in Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977); Memorandum of
H.J.F. (Apr. 8, 1976) (1.9 pages) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library as part of
the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 23, Exchange National Bank folder) (casebook
opinion in Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976));
Memorandum of H.J.F. (Dec. 3, 1975) (5 pages) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 24, folder 9) (casebook opinion
in United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976)); Memorandum of H.J.F. (Feb. 20,
1973) (9 pages) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Pa-
pers, supra note 46, box 30, Gerstle folder) (casebook opinion in Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973)); Memorandum of H.J.F. (Nov. 11, 1971) (3
pages) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra
note 46, box 30, Leasco folder) (casebook opinion in Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.
v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972)); Memorandum of H.J.F. (May 12, 1971) (3 pages)
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46,
box 25, folder 56) (casebook opinion in Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971));
Memorandum of H.J.F. (Jan. 14, 1968) (6.5 pages) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 19, Electrical Specialty folder)
(casebook opinion in Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937
(2d Cir. 1969)); Memorandum of H.J.F. (Nov. 9,1965) (2.8 pages) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box 13, Colonial Realty
folder) (casebook opinion in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966)); Memorandum of H.J.F. (Dec. 7, 1964) (3.2 pages) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library as part of the Friendly Papers, supra note 46, box
12, folder 60) (casebook opinion in Willheim v. Murchison, 342 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965)).
Of course, it is entirely conceivable that Judge Friendly wrote longer than average voting
memoranda regardless of the subject area. This possibility was not explored.
314. See supra text accompanying note 158.
315. See supra text accompanying note 164.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 159, 165.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 244-83.
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And finally there was Judge Friendly's seniority on the court. While
those who study federal appeals courts mention seniority as a factor in
opinion assignments,318 they do not articulate the underlying rationale for
its use. 319 Perhaps seniority is simply a proxy for experience. Alterna-
tively, it may reflect and express deference to the subject-matter prefer-
ences of those with long years of service. Whatever the rationale,
seniority worked in Judge Friendly's favor. When he joined the Second
Circuit in 1959, he had eight senior colleagues. 320 By 1966, he had lost
four of them 321 and gained six new (and thus junior) colleagues, 322
thereby acquiring seniority over a majority of the members of the Second
Circuit before the critical period was even a third over.323
Judge Friendly's seniority, coupled with his interest and expertise in
securities regulation, probably also brought him a disproportionate share
of securities opinions that broke important new ground. Indeed, it is with
respect to important opinions that the call for his expertise would have
been greatest. Moreover, important opinions would probably heighten
the relevance of his interest, since interest breeds the effort and attention
that important opinions require.
To appreciate the significance of these factors, contemplate how a few
changes might have altered the allocation of securities opinions among
Second Circuit judges during the critical period. Suppose, for example,
that another judge besides Friendly had worked on the Code and approx-
imated him in seniority. That judge would probably have been assigned
some significant portion of the major securities opinions that went in-
stead to Judge Friendly. At least in the area of securities regulation,
Judge Friendly's name might today be less well known.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article shows that Judge Friendly did not acquire his reputation in
securities regulation solely by doing excellent work. Like George Orwell,
Charles Darwin, and other leading writers and scientists, he benefited
from contingencies-fortuitous features of the social context. These con-
318. See supra text accompanying note 307.
319. See id.
320. The eight were Judges Clark, L. Hand, Hincks, Lumbard, Medina, Moore, Swan,
and Waterman. 268 F.2d XII & n.3. While Chase was also listed, id., he wrote his last
published opinion in 1957. See United States v. Johnson, 247 F.2d 5, 6 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 355 U.S. 867 (1957).
321. The four were Judge L. Hand, who died Aug. 18, 1961, 290 F.2d VII & n.1; Judge
Clark, who died Dec. 13, 1963, 323 F.2d VIII & n.1; Judge Hincks, who died Sept. 30, 1964,
334 F.2d VIII & n.2; and Judge Swan, whose last published opinion was Carrier Corp. v.
J.E. Schecter Corp., 347 F.2d 153 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904 (1965).
322. They were Judge Smith, sworn in on Sept. 14, 1960, 279 F.2d VIII & n.1; Judge
Kaufman, sworn in on Sept. 29, 1961, 292 F.2d VIII & n.1; Judge Marshall, sworn in on
Oct. 23, 1961, 293 F.2d VIII & n.1; Judge Hays, sworn in on Nov. 2, 1961, id. at n.2; Judge
Anderson, sworn in on Aug. 20, 1964, 332 F.2d VIII & n.1; Judge Feinberg, sworn in on
Mar. 18, 1966, 355 F.2d VIII & n.1.
323. The critical period runs from Nov. 8, 1961 to Mar. 23, 1977. See supra text accom-
panying notes 76-77.
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tingencies included the interplay between his work and his era, the partic-
ular court on which he served, the support provided him by a leading law
professor, and the sheer quantity of his securities opinions.
To acknowledge that Judge Friendly's reputation in securities regula-
tion was to some extent contingent does not diminish his accomplish-
ments. Rather, it, aids in understanding how his formidable talents
received the recognition they enjoyed.
The role of contingencies in creating judicial reputations remains
largely unexplored. Exploration promises not only to yield new insights
about individual judges but also to highlight important questions concern-
ing the judicial system itself. Are alliances between leading judges and
law professors useful in explaining doctrinal shifts in the law? What con-
straints should govern those alliances? Does a judge who writes a dispro-
portionate share of opinions in a particular subject area acquire more
power to shape the law in that area than one judge should have? Dispas-
sionate analysis of both the genesis and role of reputation in our judicial
system has scarcely begun.
1997] A JUDICIAL REPUTATION
APPENDIX I
This Appendix lists opinions of Judge Friendly that appear as "princi-
pal cases" in current securities regulation casebooks or have previously so
appeared in the predecessor editions of those casebooks. "Principal
cases" are opinions reprinted largely in full. They may include concur-
ring, dissenting, and en banc opinions, as well as majority opinions of
three-judge panels.
Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971), affd
sub nom. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411
U.S. 582 (1973), reprinted in RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD
MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 1287 (3d ed. 1972).
SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Products Corp., 687 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1086 (1982), reprinted in DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS L.
HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION 36 (5th ed. 1996); DAVID L.
RATNER & THOMAS L. HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION 247 (4th
ed. 1991); DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION 243 (3d ed.
1986).
Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967), reprinted in RICHARD W.
JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1056 (7th ed. 1992);
RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 1093 (6th ed. 1987); RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD
MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 1013 (3d ed. 1972); RICHARD
W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 803
(2d ed. 1968); DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS L. HAZEN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 252 (5th ed. 1996); SECURITIES REGULATION 164 (4th
ed. 1991); DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS L. HAZEN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 162 (3d ed. 1986); SECURITIES REGULATION 157 (2d
ed. 1980); DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION 151 (1st ed.
1975); LARRY D. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION 385 (1st
ed. 1982).
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975), reprinted in JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION 1343 (1991); RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 1540 (7th ed. 1992); RICHARD W. JENNINGS &
HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 1572 (6th ed. 1987);
RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 1279 (5th ed. 1982); RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD
MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 1224 (4th ed. 1977).
Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961) (en banc), reprinted in
RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 1383 (4th ed. 1977); RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD
MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 1522 (3d ed. 1972); RICHARD
W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION
1215 (2d ed. 1968); RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR.,
SECURITIES REGULATION 942 (1st ed. 1963).
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Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1174 (2d Cir. 1970)
(Friendly, J., dissenting from the denial of reconsideration en banc),
reprinted in RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 648 (6th ed. 1987); RICHARD W. JENNINGS &
HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 576 (5th ed. 1982);
DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION 844 (2d ed. 1980);
DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION 775 (1st ed. 1975);
LARRY D. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION 778 (1st ed.
1982).
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.) cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966), reprinted in RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD
MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 851 (5th ed. 1982); RICHARD
W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 882
(4th ed. 1977); RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SE-
CURITIES REGULATION 1377 (3d ed. 1972); RICHARD W. JENNINGS &
HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 1003 (2d ed. 1968);
DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION 924 (2d ed. 1980);
DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION 854 (1st ed. 1975).
Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1971), reprinted in RICH-
ARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 139 (7th ed.
1992); RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES
REGULATION 67 (6th ed. 1987); RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD
MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 74 (5th ed. 1982); RICHARD
W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 98
(4th ed. 1977); LARRY D. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION
277 (3d ed. 1996); LARRY D. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION
261 (2d ed. 1988); LARRY D. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION
392 (1st ed. 1982).
United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976), reprinted in JAMES
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